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We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when
merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will
affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which
may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult
problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus
by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does


























Figure 1: The Williamson tradeoﬀ in merger review: deadweight loss of market power (dark-
shaded triangle) vs. eﬃciency gain (light-shaded rectangle).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The traditional approach to the review of horizontal mergers stresses the tradeoﬀ between
market power and eﬃciencies. Mergers, which cause ﬁrms to internalize pricing externalities
among former rivals, increase the exercise of market power, and therefore tend to reduce social
welfare. On the other hand, since they can create eﬃciencies, horizontal mergers may instead
increase welfare. This tradeoﬀ was ﬁrst articulated by Williamson [1968] for the case of an
antitrust authority who wants to maximize aggregate surplus, using a diagram like Figure 1. In
the diagram, a competitive industry merges to become a monopolist that charges the price p0,
but lowers its marginal cost of production from c to c0. Whether aggregate surplus increases or
not depends on whether the dark-grey deadweight loss triangle exceeds the light-grey eﬃciency
gain. A similar, though even more straightforward tradeoﬀ arises when an antitrust authority
instead applies a consumer surplus standard to merger approval decisions, as is (roughly) the
case in both the U.S. and EU legal regimes. In that case, the marginal cost reduction must
be large enough that the price does not increase for the merger to be approved.
More recently, Farrell and Shapiro [1990] (see also McAfee and Williams [1992]) have pro-
vided a more complete and formal analysis of this tradeoﬀ for settings with Cournot competi-
tion. Farrell and Shapiro provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a merger to increase
consumer surplus, as well as a suﬃcient condition for a merger to increase aggregate surplus.
With few exceptions, however, the literature on merger review has focused on the approval
decision for a single merger. Yet, in reality, mergers are usually not one-time events.1 That
1Nilssen and Sorgard [1998], Motta and Vasconcelos [2005], and Matushima [2001] study mergers and an-
1is, one proposed merger in an industry may be followed by others. In that case, approval
of a merger today based on current conditions, as in the Farrell and Shapiro test, appears
inappropriate. Rather, an antitrust authority in general needs to determine the welfare eﬀect
of the current proposed merger given the potential for future merger approvals, and given the
fact that today’s merger approval decision may alter the set of mergers that are later proposed.
In this paper, we show that in many cases this apparently diﬃcult problem has a very simple
resolution: an antitrust authority who wants to maximize consumer surplus can accomplish
this objective by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today
if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.
We begin in Section 2 by establishing some preliminary characterizations of consumer
surplus-enhancing mergers and their interactions. Our central results focus on a model of
Cournot competition with constant returns to scale. Most importantly, we show in Section
2 that there is a form of complementarity between mergers in that setting. In particular,
mergers that enhance consumer surplus continue to be consumer-surplus enhancing if other
mergers that enhance consumer surplus take place. Similarly, mergers that reduce consumer
s u r p l u sc o n t i n u et ob ec o n s u m e r - s u r p l u sr e d u c ing if other mergers that reduce consumer sur-
plus take place. That is, the sign of a merger’s consumer surplus eﬀect is unchanged if another
merger whose consumer surplus eﬀect has the same sign takes place. This result, which is of
independent interest, sets the stage for our main result, which is contained in Section 3.
In Section 3 we imbed our Cournot competition framework in a dynamic model in which
merger opportunities arise, and may be proposed, over time. We show that if the set of possible
mergers is disjoint, and if mergers that are not approved in a given period may be approved
at a later date, then a completely myopic consumer surplus-based approval policy maximizes
discounted consumer surplus for every possibler e a l i z a t i o no ft h es e to ff e a s i b l em e r g e r s .
In Section 4, we discuss extensions of this result, considering other models of competition
(homogeneous and diﬀerentiated product price competition), the presence of ﬁxed costs and
exit, merger proposal costs, demand shifts, entry, continuing innovation, the use of an aggre-
gate surplus criterion, more limited information possessed by ﬁrms about each other’s merger
possibilities, and breakups.
Section 5 concludes. There we note how our model naturally gives rise to the emergence
of endogenous merger waves, and also discuss one important limitation of our results, the
assumption that potential mergers are “disjoint.”
2 Mergers in the Cournot Model
2.1 Cournot Oligopoly
Consider an industry with n ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good and competing in quantities.
Let N ≡ {1,2,...,n} denote the set of ﬁrms. Firm i’s cost of producing qi units of output is
titrust review in a dynamic context. In these papers, two mergers between two nonoverlapping pairs of ﬁrms can
take place sequentially. We discuss these papers further in Section 4. Kamien and Zang [1990], Gowrisankaran
[1999], Fauli-Oller [2000], and Pesendorfer [2005] are among a much larger set of articles that study equilibrium
merger decisions in dynamic models but without considering merger policy (and sometimes without allowing
for eﬃciencies).
2given by Ci(qi)=ciqi,w h e r eci > 0 is ﬁrm i’s marginal cost. Thus, for now, we restrict
attention to ﬁrms producing under constant returns to scale. The inverse market demand is
given by the twice diﬀerentiable function P(Q),w h e r eQ ≡
P
i∈N qi ≥ 0 is industry output.
We make the following (standard) assumption on demand.
Assumption 1 For any Q>0 such that P(Q) > 0:
(i) P0(Q) < 0;
(ii) P0(Q)+QP00(Q) < 0.
Moreover,
(iii) limQ→∞ P(Q)=0 ;
Part (i) of the assumption says that demand is downward-sloping, part (ii) implies that
quantities are strategic substitutes and that each ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is strictly




j6=i qj denote the aggregate output of all ﬁrms other than i.F i r m i’s best-
response is
b(Q−i;ci) = argmax qi≥0[P(Q−i + qi) − ci]qi. (1)
As is well known (see e.g., Farrell and Shapiro [1990]), Assumption 1 implies that each
ﬁrm’s best-response function b(·;ci) satisﬁes ∂b(Q−i;ci)/∂Q−i ∈ (−1,0) at all Q−i such that
b(Q−i;ci) > 0.
Under Assumption 1, there is a unique Nash equilibrium. Let Q∗ and q∗
i denote industry
output and ﬁrm i’s output in equilibrium. From the ﬁrst-order condition for problem (1),






if ci <P (Q∗),a n dq∗
i =0otherwise. Assumption 1 also implies that the equilibrium is
“stable,” so that comparative statics are “well behaved.” For example, we will make use of
two comparative statics properties: First, a reduction in an active ﬁrm’s marginal cost increases
its equilibrium output and proﬁt, reduces the output of each of its active rivals, and increases
aggregate output. Second, following any change in the incentives of a subset of ﬁrms, the
equilibrium aggregate output increases [decreases] if and only if the equilibrium output of that
set of ﬁrms increases [decreases].2
2.2 The CS-Eﬀect of Mergers
Consider a merger between a subset M ⊆ N of ﬁrms. The post-merger marginal cost is denoted
cM. Aggregate output before the merger is Q∗,a n da f t e ri sQ
∗
. We are interested in the eﬀect
of the merger on consumer surplus, CS(Q
∗





2See Farrell and Shapiro [1990]’s Lemma, p. 111.
3Since CS0(Q)=−QP0(Q) > 0, a merger raises consumer surplus if and only if it induces an
increase in industry output. We will say that a merger is CS-neutral if the merger does not
aﬀect consumer surplus. Similarly, we will say that a merger is CS-increasing [CS-decreasing],
if consumer surplus following the merger is higher [lower] than before. Finally, a merger is
CS-nondecreasing [CS-nonincreasing] if it is not CS-decreasing [CS-increasing].
We will say that a merger involves active ﬁr m si fa tl e a s to n eo ft h em e r g i n gﬁrms is
producing a positive quantity before the merger [and hence has ci <P (Q∗)].O b s e r v et h a ta
merger involving only inactive ﬁrms is always CS-nondecreasing and weakly proﬁtable. The
following result catalogs some useful properties of CS-neutral mergers involving active ﬁrms.
Lemma 1 If a merger involving active ﬁr m si sC S - n e u t r a l ,t h e n
1. it causes no changes in the output of any nonmerging ﬁrm nor in the total output of the
merging ﬁrms;
2. the merged ﬁrm’s margin at the pre- and post-merger price P(Q∗) equals the sum of the
active merging ﬁrms’ pre-merger margins:
P(Q∗) − cM =
X
i∈M
max{0,P(Q∗) − ci}; (3)
3. the merged ﬁrm’s marginal cost is no greater than the marginal cost of the most eﬃcient
merger partner: cM ≤ mini∈M{ci}, and it is strictly less if the merger involves at least
two active ﬁrms;
4. the merger is proﬁt a b l e( i tw e a k l yr a i s e st h ej o i n tp r o ﬁto ft h em e r g i n gﬁrms), and is
strictly proﬁtable if it involves at least two active ﬁrms.
Proof. To see Property 1, observe that under Assumption 1 there is a unique output level for
each non-merging ﬁrm i that is compatible with any given level of aggregate output Q [since
there is a unique Q−i such that Q−i + b(Q−i;ci)=Q]. Since aggregate output is unchanged
by a CS-neutral merger, all nonmerging ﬁrms’ outputs are unchanged. In turn, this implies
that the total output of the merging ﬁrms must be unchanged as well. For Property 2, a
central feature in Farrell and Shapiro [1990]’s analysis, note that the merged ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order
condition [using Property 1] is








Summing up the pre-merger ﬁrst-order conditions of the active merger partners yields
X
i∈M+
{P(Q∗) − ci + q∗
i P0(Q∗)} =0 (5)
where M+ = {i ∈ M : q∗
i > 0}. Since for all i ∈ M\M+, we have P(Q∗) ≤ ci and q∗












4Combining equations (4) and (6), yields (3). Property 3 follows directly from Property 2.
Property 4 holds since the merging ﬁrms’ joint output has not changed (Property 1), but its
margin has weakly increased, and has strictly increased if the merger involves at least two
active ﬁrms (Property 2).
The following useful corollary follows from Pro p e r t i e s2a n d4o fL e m m a1p l u st h ef a c tt h a t
the post-merger aggregate output, Q
∗
,a n dt h ep r o ﬁto ft h em e r g e dﬁrm are both decreasing
in the merged ﬁrm’s marginal cost, cM:
Corollary 1 A merger involving active ﬁr m si sC S - n e u t r a li f




CS-increasing if cM < b cM(Q∗),a n dC S - d e c r e a s i n gi fcM > b cM(Q∗). Moreover, any CS-
nondecreasing merger is proﬁtable for the merging ﬁrms, and is strictly proﬁtable if it is CS-
increasing or involves at least two active ﬁrms.
Thus, an antitrust authority concerned with maximizing consumer surplus and confronted
with a single merger involving active ﬁrms in set M would strictly prefer to approve the merger
if cM < b cM(Q∗), and would be willing to if cM ≤ b cM(Q∗). Moreover, any merger among active
ﬁrms that the antitrust authority would be willing to approve is proﬁt a b l ef o rt h em e r g i n g
parties.
Observe also that the threshold b cM(Q∗) is nondecreasing in Q∗ and is strictly decreasing
if the merger involves at least two active ﬁrms. Thus, the larger is Q∗ (and the lower is the
pre-merger price), the more likely it is that a merger is CS-nondecreasing. This fact will play
a central role in the next subsection when we look at interactions among mergers, where one
merger may lead to a change in industry output prior to the proposal of another merger. To see
the intuition for this result, consider a proposed merger between symmetric ﬁrms, each of whom
has a pre-merger marginal cost c and produces q∗ > 0 units. Since the ﬁrms are choosing
their outputs optimally before the merger, a lower pre-merger margin P(Q∗) − c (due to a
larger pre-merger aggregate output) implies a smaller pre-merger absolute value of P0(Q∗)q∗
[see (2)]. The incentives of the merged ﬁrm to raise price, however, depend on a comparison
of the merger’s marginal cost reduction ∆c =( c − cM) to the market power eﬀect, P0(Q∗)q∗,
which reﬂects the internalization of the pricing externality between the merging ﬁrms. With
a CS-nondecreasing merger, the ﬁrst eﬀect weakly exceeds the second. A smaller pre-merger
price preserves this relation and therefore the CS-nondecreasing eﬀect of the merger.
Figure 2 illustrates the cases of CS-neutral, CS-increasing, and CS-decreasing mergers. The
ﬁgure considers a merger involving the ﬁrms in set M1,a tl e a s tt w oo fw h o ma r ea c t i v e .T h e
complementary set of ﬁr m si sd e n o t e dM2 ≡ N\M1. The axes in the ﬁgure measure the
joint outputs of the two sets of ﬁrms. The curves labeled rM1 and rM2 depict what we call
the “group-reaction functions” of each set of ﬁrms prior to the merger. Speciﬁcally, Mi’s
pre-merger group-reaction function gives the joint pre-merger Nash-equilibrium output of the
ﬁrms in Mi, rMi(qMj), conditional on the ﬁrms in Mj, j 6= i, jointly producing qMj.I t i s
routine to verify that these group-reaction functions satisfy −1 <r 0
Mi(qMj) < 0.
The equilibrium before the merger is point A, the intersection of the two pre-merger group-
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Figure 2: A merger involving the ﬁrms in M1. Depending on the merged ﬁrm’s marginal cost,
the merger is CS-neutral [point A], CS-increasing [point B], or CS-decreasing [point C]. In the
ﬁgure, c00
M1 > b cM1(Q∗) > c0
M1.
6ﬁrm, b(·;b cM1(Q∗)), intersects group M2’s group-reaction curve, rM2(·),a tp o i n tA . 3 With a CS-
increasing merger, the merged ﬁrm’s marginal cost is less than b cM1(Q∗), so its best-response
curve lies further to the right, shifting the equilibrium to point B, where there is a larger
aggregate output. In contrast, with a CS-decreasing merger, the merged ﬁrm’s marginal
cost is greater than b cM1(Q∗), so its best-response curve lies further to the left, shifting the
equilibrium to point C, where there is a smaller aggregate output.
2.3 Interactions between Mergers
We now turn to the interactions between mergers. In this subsection, we consider two potential
disjoint mergers, involving ﬁrms in sets M1 and M2 with M1 ∩ M2 = ∅. We will refer to
these simply as merger M1 and merger M2.T h es e to fﬁrms not involved in either merger is
Nc ≡ N\(M1 ∪ M2).
Our ﬁrst result establishes a certain complementarity between mergers that change con-
sumer surplus in the same direction:4
Proposition 1 The sign of the CS-eﬀect of two disjoint mergers is complementary:
(i) if a merger is CS-nondecreasing (and hence proﬁtable) in isolation, it remains CS-nondecreasing
(and hence proﬁtable) if another merger that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation takes place;
(ii) if a merger is CS-decreasing in isolation, it remains CS-decreasing if another merger that
is CS-nonincreasing in isolation takes place.
Proof. For part (i), suppose that mergers M1 and M2 are both CS-nondecreasing in isolation.
Let Q∗ denote aggregate output in the absence of either merger and let Q
∗
i denote aggregate
output if only merger Mi takes place. So Q
∗
i ≥ Q∗ for i =1 ,2. Without loss of generality,
consider merger M1. Suppose, ﬁrst, that merger M1 involves only inactive ﬁrms once merger
M2 takes place. Then, once merger M2 takes place, merger M1 must be CS-nondecreasing
and (weakly) proﬁtable .
Suppose, instead, that merger M1 involves active ﬁrms once merger M2 takes place, which
also means [since P(Q
∗
2) ≤ P(Q∗)]t h a ti ti n v o l v e sa c t i v eﬁr m sw h e nd o n ei ni s o l a t i o n .S i n c e
it is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, from Corollary 1 we know that cM1 ≤ b cM1(Q∗).M o r e o v e r ,
3The post-merger best-response curve b(·;cM1) must cross the pre-merger group reaction curve rM1(·) from




> [<]b(qM2; cM1(qM2 + rM1(qM2)))
= rM1(qM2),
where the inequality follows because  cM1(·) is a strictly increasing function and b(qM2;c) is strictly decreasing
in c at all qM2 such that b(qM2;c) > 0, and the last equality follows because  cM1(qM2 + rM1(qM2)) is the cost
level at which the merged ﬁrm’s best response to qM2 is exactly rM1(qM2).
4P r o p o s i t i o n1f o c u s e so np r o p e r t i e sn e e d e dl a t e ri nt h i ss e c t i o na n df o rS e c t i o n3 . I ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt o
show as well that a CS-increasing merger Mi remains CS-increasing if a merger Mj that is CS-nondecreasing
takes place provided the merger Mi remains among active ﬁrms once merger Mj takes place, and that a merger
among active ﬁrms that is CS-nonincreasing remains CS-nonincreasing if a merger that is CS-nonincreasing
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Figure 3: Each merger is CS-increasing in isolation and remains so if the other merger takes
place.
because the threshold b cM1(Q) is nondecreasing in Q,w eh a v ecM1 ≤ b cM1(Q
∗
2). Hence, Corollary
1 implies that merger M1 is also CS-nondecreasing once merger M2 has taken place.
The argument for part (ii) follows similar lines (note that a CS-decreasing merger must
involve active ﬁrms, and must continue to do so after another CS-decreasing merger takes
place).
Figure 3 illustrates the complementarity between two mergers that are CS-increasing in
isolation when no other ﬁrms exist (Nc = ∅). In isolation, merger M1 moves the equilibrium
from point A to point B, while merger M2 moves the equilibrium from point A to point C.B u t ,
conditional on merger M1 taking place, merger M2 moves the equilibrium from point B to point
D along b(·;cM1).S i n c e∂b(·;cM1)/∂Q−i ∈ (−1,0), aggregate output must increase. That is,
conditional on merger M1 taking place, merger M2 remains CS-increasing. Moreover, we know
from Corollary 1 that it also remains proﬁtable. Using the same type of argument, the reverse
is also true: conditional on merger M2 taking place, the merger M1 remains CS-increasing and
proﬁtable.
We now turn to the interaction between mergers that have opposite eﬀects on consumer
surplus if implemented in isolation. Speciﬁcally, suppose that merger M1 is CS-nondecreasing
(and therefore proﬁtable) in isolation, while merger M2 is CS-decreasing in isolation. Figure 4
illustrates that merger M2 can become CS-increasing (and therefore strictly proﬁtable) condi-
tional on merger M1 occurring. In isolation, merger M2 moves the equilibrium from point A
to point C along rM1(·), and thus decreases industry output. But after merger M1 has taken
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Figure 4: A CS-decreasing merger M2 that becomes CS-increasing after a CS-increasing merger
M1 takes place.
increases industry output.
When this occurs, we can say the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that merger M1 is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, while merger M2 is
CS-decreasing in isolation but CS-nondecreasing once merger M1 has taken place. Then:
(i) merger M1 is CS-increasing (and therefore strictly proﬁtable) conditional on merger M2
taking place;
(ii) the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms involved in merger M1 is strictly larger if both mergers take
place than if neither merger takes place.
Proof. Consider implementing merger M1 ﬁrst followed by merger M2. By hypothesis, con-
sumer surplus weakly increases after each step, so the combined eﬀect on consumer surplus
of the two mergers is nonnegative. Suppose we now reverse the order and implement merger
M2 ﬁrst. Since the combined eﬀect of the two mergers on consumer surplus is nonnegative
while the eﬀect of merger M2 is strictly negative, consumer surplus must strictly increase when
merger M1 is implemented following merger M2. Hence, part (i) must hold: merger M1 is
CS-increasing (and therefore strictly proﬁtable) conditional on merger M2 taking place.
9To see that part (ii) holds, suppose that merger M2 is implemented ﬁrst. Since merger M2
is CS-decreasing in isolation, it must weakly increase the proﬁt of each ﬁrm i ∈ M1 [the joint
output of all ﬁrms other than i must decrease, otherwise the fact that ∂b(·;ci)/∂Q−i ∈ (−1,0)
would imply that aggregate output increases]. Since merger M1 is strictly proﬁtable given
merger M2, the sequence of mergers must strictly increase the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms in M1.
The result is illustrated in Figure 4, where merger M1 is CS-increasing (and hence strictly
proﬁtable) in isolation and remains so conditional on merger M2 taking place, at which point
it moves the equilibrium from point C to point D along b(·;cM2).
Remark 1 Observe that the logic of Proposition 2 can be extended to cases with a merger
M1 that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation and a collection of mergers M2,...,MK that are each
CS-decreasing in isolation but form a sequence that is CS-nondecreasing at each step after
merger M1 has taken place. In such cases, merger M1 is CS-increasing (and therefore strictly
proﬁtable) given that mergers M2,...,MK have taken place, and the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms
involved in merger M1 is strictly larger if all of these mergers take place than if none do. We
will use this extension of Proposition 2 in Section 3.
3 CS-Maximizing Merger Review
In this section, we embed the Cournot model of Section 2 in a dynamic model where merger
opportunities arise stochastically over time, merger proposals are endogenous, and the antitrust
authority decides whether or not to approve proposed mergers. We consider the optimal merger
approval policy for an antitrust authority concerned with maximizing discounted consumer
surplus. We show that such an antitrust authority can achieve its optimal outcome using a
myopic policy that in each period approves a set of mergers that maximizes consumer surplus
given the current market structure, ignoring the possibility of any future mergers.
As before, we denote the set of n ﬁrms by N. The set of possible mergers are those in set
{M1,...,MK},w h e r eMk ⊆ N is a set of ﬁrms that may merge. We assume that these possible
mergers are disjoint; that is, Mj ∩ Mk = ∅ for j 6= k.T h u s , n o ﬁrm has the possibility of
being part of more than one merger.5 The assumption of disjointness is reasonable when each
ﬁrm belongs to at most a single set of “natural” merger partners who can generate signiﬁcant
eﬃciencies by merging, perhaps because they use similar or complementary technologies. If all
other mergers both increase market power and fail to generate eﬃciencies, no other mergers
but these would ever optimally be approved by the antitrust authority.6 (We discuss the
disjointness assumption further in Section 5.)
The merger process lasts for T periods. Merger Mk ﬁrst becomes feasible at the start of
period t with probability pkt ∈ [0,1],w h e r e
P
t pkt ≤ 1. Conditional on merger Mk becoming
feasible in period t,t h eﬁrms in Mk receive and observe a random draw of their post-merger cost
5Our results can be extended to allow for a given ﬁrm to be part of several diﬀerent possible mergers provided
that at most one of these mergers ever becomes feasible along any path.
6Because it takes a strictly positive cost reduction to oﬀset the market power increase from a merger (recall
Lemma 1), it is frequently enough to justify the disjointness assumption if other mergers cannot generate large
enough cost reductions.
10cMk.T h i sc o s ti sd r a w nf r o mt h es e tCkt with distribution function Gkt(·).7 This formulation
embodies another form of disjointness in merger possibilities: merger Mk receives at most one
eﬃciency realization throughout the merger process.8 We denote the set of mergers that have
become feasible up to and including period t (including their cost realizations) by Ft.
In each period t,a l lﬁrms with feasible but not-yet-approved mergers decide whether to
propose them or not. Previously proposed but rejected mergers can be proposed again, as can
previously unproposed feasible mergers. We denote by Pt the set of mergers proposed in period
t. The antitrust authority then responds by approving some subset of the proposed mergers.
We denote by At the set of mergers approved by the end of period t;t h a ti s ,At is the market
structure at the end of the period after the merger review process has concluded. Note that
we must have At−1 ⊆ At ⊆ (At−1 ∪ Pt) ⊆ Ft;t h eﬁrst inclusion follows because the set of
approved mergers weakly grows over time, the second because only proposed mergers can be
approved, and the third because only feasible mergers that have not yet been approved can be
proposed.9
We assume that when a merger Mk becomes feasible in a period t, one of the ﬁrms in Mk
is designated as the “proposer” of the merger. To keep things simple, we treat bargaining in
a reduced-form manner, assuming that the proposer chooses whether to propose the merger to
the antitrust authority, and that if he chooses to do so, the ﬁrms in Mk split the proﬁtg a i n s
or losses from the merger in some ﬁxed proportions (the proportions do not matter).10
The antitrust authority observes that a particular merger is feasible and its eﬃciency (post-
merger marginal cost) once it is proposed. For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms observe both
their own and their rivals’ merger possibilities, including their eﬃciencies, when they become
feasible. (We discuss in Section 4.9 how our results extend if ﬁrms possess less information
about rivals’ mergers, for example observing their feasibility only once they are proposed and
their eﬃciency only once they are approved.)
Payoﬀsi ne a c hp e r i o dt depend only on the set of mergers At approved by the end of that
p e r i o d ,a n da r ed e t e r m i n e db yac o m p l e t ei n f o r m a t i o nC o u r n o tg a m e ,a si nS e c t i o n2 . E a c h
agent i, whether the antitrust authority or a proposer ﬁrm, discounts future payoﬀs( c o n s u m e r
surplus or proﬁt) according to a discount factor δi ≤ 1.11
3.1 Myopic Merger Policies
We are interested in the performance of “myopic” merger review policies, which in each period
maximize consumer surplus given the set of proposed mergers and current market structure,
ignoring the possibility of future mergers. Toward this end, we start by introducing the
following deﬁnitions:
7Note that our assumptions allow the sequence of feasible mergers and their cost realizations to be deter-
ministic.
8We relax this assumption in Section 4.7.
9In the model, we do not allow previously approved mergers to be dissolved. However, it follows from our
arguments that no (approved) merged ﬁr mw o u l dw a n tt od os o .
10The only important feature of this assumption is that it implies that merger Mk is proposed if it raises the
joint expected discounted proﬁto ft h ep o t e n t i a lm e r g e rp a r t n e r sa n dw i l ln o tb ep r o p o s e di fi tl o w e r si t .
11Implicitly, to justify our proﬁt-splitting assumption, we assume that each ﬁrm in a given merger M has the
same discount factor.
11Deﬁnition 1 A set of approved mergers At ⊆ (At−1∪ Pt) ⊆ Ft is myopically CS-maximizing
for Pt given market structure At−1 if it maximizes consumer surplus in the current period
(period t) given Pt and At−1.
In our model with unchanging demand, maximizing current period consumer surplus is
equivalent to maximizing discounted consumer surplus assuming that there will be no subse-
quent changes in market structure.
Deﬁnition 2 A myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is a merger approval rule that
in each period t approves mergers as a function of the already-approved mergers At−1,t h e
current set of proposed mergers Pt, and perhaps the period t, resulting in a new market structure
A∗
t(Pt|At−1) that is myopically CS-maximizing for Pt given market structure At−1.
While we note later in Remark 2 that our main result holds for any myopically CS-
maximizing merger policy, for ease of exposition we focus on the performance of the most
lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. In this policy, the antitrust authority re-
solves any indiﬀerence about mergers in favor of approval, selecting in each period the largest
possible set of mergers to approve among those sets that maximize consumer surplus. We call
such a set a “largest myopically CS-maximizing set”:
Deﬁnition 3 A set of approved mergers At ⊆ (At−1∪ Pt) is a largest myopically CS-
maximizing set for Pt given market structure At−1 if it is not contained in any other
s e tt h a ti sm y o p i c a l l yC S - m a x i m i z i n gf o rPt given At−1.
Given the ﬁniteness of the set of proposed mergers Pt, a largest myopically CS-maximizing
set must always exist. In fact, there is a unique such “largest” set for any existing market
structure At−1 and set of proposed mergers Pt, which we denote by A
∗
(Pt|At−1),a n dt h i ss e t
contains every other myopically CS-maximizing set for At−1 and Pt.M o r e o v e r , t h i s s e t g r o w s
as the set of proposed mergers grows:
Lemma 2 For each set of proposed mergers Pt and current market structure At−1,t h e r ei s
a unique largest myopically CS-maximizing set A
∗
(Pt|At−1) and it contains every other myopi-








Proof. In the Appendix.
The most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is therefore the one that ap-
proves in each period the largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers:
Deﬁnition 4 The most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is the my-
opically CS-maximizing merger policy that in each period t implements the largest myopically
CS-maximizing set given the proposed mergers Pt and current market structure At−1,r e s u l t i n g
in new market structure A
∗
(Pt|At−1).
Note that the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is independent of the
period t, since it depends only on the payoﬀ-relevant variables Pt and At−1.
Importantly, the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy can also be thought
o fa st h er e s u l to fa na n t i t r u s tp o l i c yt h a te v a l u a t e sp r o p o s e dm e r g e r si na ne v e nm o r em y o p i c
12way, making decisions on mergers within each period in a step-by-step fashion and approving
a merger at each step if and only if it is CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure
(including any mergers that have already been approved in that period), and continuing until no
further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identiﬁed (including mergers that may have already
been examined but rejected earlier in the period). Speciﬁcally:
Lemma 3 Suppose that the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-by-
step fashion, approving mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure
until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identiﬁed. Then if Pt is the set of proposed
mergers and At−1 is the market structure at the start of the period, the set of approved mergers
at the end of period t will be A
∗
(Pt|At−1).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Thus, our results will apply to any antitrust policy that considers mergers one at a time,
approving each merger if it is CS-nondecreasing given the current market conditions.
3.2 Optimality of Myopic Merger Policy
Our main result shows that the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is a
dynamically optimal policy for the antitrust authority. The argument has two parts. First,
we show that if all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are proposed in each period — so that
the antitrust authority need not worry about ﬁrms’ incentives to propose mergers — then the
most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus
for every realized sequence of feasible mergers.
Lemma 4 If all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are proposed in each period, the most
lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, which induces the approval sequence A1 =
A
∗
(F1|∅) and At = A
∗
(Ft\At−1|At−1) for all t>1, maximizes discounted consumer surplus
for every realization of feasible mergers F =( F1,...,FT).
Proof. Given the realized sequence of feasible mergers F =( F1,...,FT), consider the problem
of maximizing discounted consumer surplus. If we ignore the monotonicity constraint that the
set of approved mergers cannot shrink over time, we can choose the approved set of mergers
(i.e., the market structure) in each period independently from the mergers approved in every





is optimal since it maximizes consumer surplus in every period.
Consider now the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. We will show that




(FT|∅)}, from which observation
the result follows. To do so we will actually establish a slightly stronger fact, which will also
be useful in the proof of Proposition 3: If the antitrust authority follows the most lenient
myopically CS-maximizing merger policy in periods 1,...,t − 1 and if all feasible but not-yet-
approved mergers are proposed in period t, the market structure at the end of period t will be
A
∗
(Ft|∅) regardless of the merger proposals that ﬁrms have made in periods 1,...,t − 1.
To see this, consider an arbitrary period t and suppose that At−1 ⊆ A
∗
(Ft−1|∅) regardless
of the history of previous merger proposals (which is true if t =1 ). If all feasible but not-yet-
approved mergers are proposed in period t,t h e nAt = A
∗





(Ft|∅). Observe that the problem of myopically maximizing consumer
surplus given previously approved mergers At−1 a n dp r o p o s e dm e r g e r sFt\At−1 is a more
constrained problem than is the problem of myopically maximizing consumer surplus given no





(Ft|∅) (the ﬁrst inclusion follows by hypothesis and the second by Lemma 2), the largest
solution to this latter, less constrained problem is feasible in the former, more constrained





(Ft|∅), which implies that, if all mergers are proposed in period
t, the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing policy induces the set At = A
∗
(Ft|∅) in period
t. Note also that since Pt ⊆ Ft, the monotonicity of the largest myopically CS-maximizing
set A
∗
(Pt|At−1) in Pt, established in Lemma 2, implies that At ⊆ A
∗
(Ft|∅), regardless of the
merger proposals made up through and including period t. Thus, our induction hypothesis
holds when we look at period t +1 . Applying induction, yields the result.
Lemma 4 shows that myopic behavior causes no problem for the antitrust agency when
it does not need to worry about ﬁrms’ proposal incentives. At its heart, the result follows
from two features: (i) the complementarity of CS-nondecreasing mergers — which implies that
the antitrust authority will never later regret approval of a CS-nondecreasing merger due to
the appearance of a new CS-nondecreasing merger, and (ii) the fact that since the antitrust
authority can always approve a merger at a later date, it will never later regret rejection of a
merger that is CS-decreasing given the current market structure.
The second part of the argument concerns ﬁrms’ incentives to propose mergers. Since the
antitrust agency is free to reject mergers it does not like, its only concern is that ﬁrms may not
propose mergers that it would like to approve. To establish our main result, we will show that
when the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy
the ﬁrms’ proposal incentives are aligned with the desires of the antitrust authority. More
speciﬁcally, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms in which every feasible
merger is proposed in every period. Moreover, all subgame perfect Nash equilibria result in
t h es a m e( o p t i m a l )s e q u e n c eo fp e r i od-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proposition 3 Suppose the antitrust authority follows the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing
merger policy. Then:
(i) All feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms. In this equilibrium, the outcome maximizes discounted
consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers F =( F1,...,FT).
(ii) For each sequence F, every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same optimal
sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proof. (i) The proof of the ﬁrst claim is by induction. Consider, a period t and suppose
that starting in period t+1the joint expected continuation payoﬀ of the ﬁrms in each possible
feasible merger is independent of ﬁrms’ prior behavior. (Note that this is true in period T.)
We will establish that regardless of the previous history or rivals’ proposal strategies in period
t, it is optimal in period t for every proposer ﬁrm with a feasible but-not-yet approved merger
14to propose it.12
To see this, consider a ﬁrm that is the proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger
Mk. Note that since continuation payoﬀs are (by hypothesis) unaﬀected by period t play, it
is optimal to propose the merger if proposing it maximizes the joint expected period t payoﬀ
of the ﬁrms in Mk.L e t b P d e n o t ear e a l i z a t i o no ft h es e to fp r o p o s e dm e r g e r si np e r i o dt
if merger Mk is proposed (ﬁrms in other feasible but not-yet-approved mergers may be using
mixed strategies) and let b P−k ≡ b P\Mk denote that realization without merger Mk included.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that b P−k is such that merger Mk is not approved when proposed. Then
the set of approved mergers, and hence the joint period-t expected payoﬀ of the ﬁrms in Mk,





(b P|At−1) ⊆ (b P−k ∪ At−1),w h e r et h eﬁrst inclusion follows from Lemma 2
and the second from the fact that merger Mk is not approved when proposed. But approving
set A
∗
(b P|At−1) is therefore feasible and myopically CS-maximizing when mergers b P−k are
proposed.13 Since A
∗
(b P−k|At−1) is the largest myopically CS—maximizing set for b P−k given





Suppose, instead, that b P−k is such that merger Mk is approved when proposed, but that
the merged ﬁrm Mk is inactive (produces zero output) in period t after its merger is approved.
Then, merger Mk is CS-neutral given the other mergers that are approved, which implies that
A
∗





(b P|At−1)\Mk ⊆ (b P−k ∪At−1).T h e s e t A
∗
(b P|At−1)\Mk is therefore
both feasible and myopically CS-maximizing for b P−k given At−1 (recall footnote 13), which
implies that we must have A
∗
(b P|At−1)\Mk = A
∗
(b P−k|At−1); that is, proposal of merger Mk
does not aﬀect the set of other mergers that are approved in period t. As a result, proposal
of merger Mk has no eﬀect on the joint period-t proﬁts of the ﬁrms in Mk, which are zero in
either case.
Finally, suppose that b P−k is such that merger Mk is approved when proposed and that the
merged ﬁrm Mk is active in period t after its merger is approved. We distinguish between
two cases. First, suppose that A
∗
(b P−k|At−1) ∪ Mk = A
∗
(b P|At−1). In this case, proposing
merger Mk does not aﬀect the other mergers that will be approved. Since Mk ∈ A
∗
(b P|At−1),
the merger is CS-nondecreasing given the other mergers that will be approved, and is therefore
[by Corollary 1] strictly proﬁtable to propose. Second, suppose that A
∗
(b P−k|At−1) ∪ Mk ⊂
A
∗





(b P−k|At−1) that is CS-nondecreasing at each step. However, since
all of the mergers in this set other than Mk must be CS-decreasing given that the mergers in
A
∗
(b P−k|At−1) have taken place [otherwise they would have been in A
∗
(b P−k|At−1)], merger Mk
must be CS-nondecreasing given that the mergers in A
∗
(b P−k|At−1) have occurred and must
be the ﬁrst merger in this sequence. By Remark 1, the ﬁrms in Mk have a strictly greater




(b P−k|At−1) are approved than when none are.
12The history prior to period t’s proposal stage consists of the sequences Ft =( F1,...,Ft) of feasible mergers,
Pt−1 =( P1,...,Pt−1) of proposed mergers, and At−1 =( A1,...,At−1) of approved mergers. This history,
w h i c hi so b s e r v e db ya l lﬁrms, determines a subgame that starts in period t.
13Note that if Pt ⊆ P0
t and At and A0
t are myopically CS-maximizing for, respectively, Pt and P0
t given At−1,
then the level of consumer surplus under A0
t must be at least as great as under At (with more mergers proposed,
it is a less constrained problem). Hence, if A0
t is feasible for Pt given At−1 —t h a ti s ,i fA0
t ⊆ (Pt ∪ At−1) —
then A0
t must also be myopically CS-maximizing for Pt given At−1.
15Hence, it is strictly more proﬁtable in this case as well to propose merger Mk.
In summary, it is an optimal strategy for every feasible but not-yet-approved merger Mk to
be proposed in period t regardless of the previous history and rivals’ period-t proposal strategies.
The set of approved mergers at the end of period t will therefore be A
∗
(Ft\At−1|At−1).B y





At−1 that can arise under the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Thus,
the market structure (and joint expected payoﬀso ft h eﬁrms in each possible merger) at the
e n do fp e r i o dt is independent of ﬁrms’ behavior prior to period t. Our induction hypothesis
therefore holds when we look at period t −1. Applying induction starting in period T implies
that in every period proposing every feasible but not-yet-approved merger is optimal.





0(Pt|At−1) denote those mergers in Pt ∩ A
∗
(Pt|At−1) that result in merged ﬁrms that










denote the complementary set. Note that approval of inactive mergers has no eﬀect on either
consumer surplus or ﬁrms’ payoﬀs. This implies that if all mergers in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1
are proposed — i.e., if A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1) ⊆ (Pt ∪ At−1) — then the largest myopically CS-
maximizing set A
∗







so consumer surplus and all ﬁrms’ payoﬀs will be the same in period t as if all feasible but
not-yet-approved mergers were proposed.14
We now show that when the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is
Ft\At−1,e v e r ym e r g e ri nA
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 will be proposed. The proof is by induction.
The induction hypothesis for period t is that in all future periods τ>t , whenever the set of








1(Ft\At−1|At−1) is a myopi-
cally CS-maximizing set for Ft\At−1 given At−1, every merger in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1) is CS-
nondecreasing given every other merger in that set. Since At−1 ⊆ A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1), Lemma
6(i) (in the Appendix) implies that, starting from At−1, there is an ordering of the merg-
ers in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 that is CS-nondecreasing at each step, which we denote by
(M1,...,MS). Suppose that all mergers Ms for s<kare proposed when Ft\At−1 is the set of
feasible and not-yet-approved mergers in period t. (Note that this assumption is valid when
k =1 .) If b Pt = {M1,...,Mk}, then since the sequence (M1,...,Mk) is CS-nondecreasing at each
step, we will have A
∗
({M1,...,Mk}|At−1)={M1,...,Mk}∪At−1; that is, all of these mergers,
including merger Mk, will be approved.15 If, instead, {M1,...,Mk} ⊂ b Pt, then Lemma 2 implies
that ({M1,...,Mk} ∪ At−1) ⊆ A
∗
(b Pt|At−1), so merger Mk is still approved. Since merger Mk
14The ﬁrst inclusion follows because A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1) is myopically CS-maximizing for Ft\At−1 given
At−1, and is feasible when the set of proposed mergers is A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1⊆ Ft\At−1. Therefore, by
the logic in footnote 13, A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1) is myopically CS-maximizing for A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 given
At−1. The inclusion then follows from Lemma 2, since A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 ⊆ Pt.
15In particular, by Lemma 6(ii), every merger in set {M1,...,M k} is CS-nondecreasing given every other
merger in the set. By Lemma 6(i), if a strict subset of {M1,...,M k} were approved, there would be a pro-
posed but unapproved merger that could be approved without lowering consumer surplus, so all mergers in
{M1,...,Mk} will be approved in the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy.
16is certain to be approved if proposed, and results in an active ﬁrm, our argument in part (i)
implies that proposal of the merger Mk is strictly proﬁtable. Applying induction starting at
k =1 ,w es e et h a ti fFt\At−1 is the set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers, all mergers
in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 will be proposed.
Applying induction starting in period T,we conclude that in every period t if the set of feasi-
ble but not-yet-approved mergers in period t is Ft\At−1,t h e ne v e r ym e r g e ri nA
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1
will be proposed in that period. The result follows.
Proposition 3 shows that a myopic merger policy that in each period approves the largest set
of mergers that maximizes current consumer surplus (or, equivalently, maximizes discounted
consumer surplus ignoring the possibility of any further changes in market structure) is dynam-
ically optimal for the antitrust authority in that it maximizes discounted consumer surplus.
Indeed, the proposition establishes an even stronger result: the antitrust authority could not
do better even if it knew at the start of the process what the entire sequence of feasible mergers
(F1,...,FT) would be and could implement feasible but unproposed mergers.16
In addition, by Lemma 3, the result implies that an even more myopic policy in which the
antitrust authority considers mergers individually in a sequential fashion, myopically approving
each merger if it is CS-nondecreasing given the market structure at the time of its review, is
also dynamically optimal in this very strong sense.
Finally, we make the following observation:
Remark 2 While for ease of exposition we have restricted attention to the most lenient myopi-
cally CS-maximizing merger policy, dynamic optimality holds for any myopically CS-maximizing
merger policy. See the Appendix for a discussion.
4E x t e n s i o n s
In this section, we discuss a number of extensions of our model. We defer the discussion of one
important limitation of our model, the disjointness of mergers, to Section 5.
4.1 Price competition
So far, we have assumed that ﬁrms compete in quantities. In this subsection, we discuss the
case where ﬁrms compete in prices rather than quantities. We show that our basic conclusion
continues to hold, albeit in a somewhat weaker form. Speciﬁcally, part (i) of Proposition 3
extends to the case of price competition, while part (ii) of that proposition does not. That is,
under the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy there is an equilibrium that
maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers, but
there may also be other equilibria that do not.
To proceed, suppose that, as before, there are n ﬁrms producing a homogeneous good at
constant returns to scale. Firm i’s marginal cost and price are denoted ci and pi. Market
demand is given by the nonincreasing function Q(p),w h e r ep is the lowest price oﬀered by any
16Moreover, the fact that the largest myopically CS-maximizing set monotonically increases over time implies
that the antitrust authority also could not do better if it could undo previously approved mergers, which we
have assumed is not possible.
17ﬁrm. Let ι(i|N) ∈ N denote the ﬁrm with the ith lowest marginal cost when the set of ﬁrms is
N, i.e., cι(1|N) ≤ cι(2|N) ≤ ... ≤ cι(n|N). (If a subset of ﬁrms have the same marginal cost, then
the ﬁrms in this subset are ordered arbitrarily.) Assuming that Q(cι(1|N)) > 0 and Assumption
1 holds, and restricting attention to the standard Bertrand pricing equilibrium17, ﬁrm ι(i|N)’s
equilibrium price pι(i|N) is given by
pι(i|N) =
(
ci if 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
min{pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} if i =1 ,
(7)
where the nondecreasing function pm(c) ≡ argmaxp(p−c)Q(p) is the monopoly price of a ﬁrm
with marginal cost c. In equilibrium, all consumers purchase at price pι(1|N), and so consumer





Note that CS(p1,p 2,...,pn) is independent of pι(i|N) for i>1, and nonincreasing in pι(1|N).
One important diﬀerence between the Cournot and Bertrand models is that with Bertrand
competition a merger that is CS-neutral in isolation can become CS-decreasing when another
merger takes place that is CS-increasing in isolation, as the following example demonstrates:
Example 1 Suppose there are four ﬁrms, N = {1,2,3,4},w i t hi n i t i a lc o s t sc1 =5 , c2 =1 0 ,
c3 =1 5 , c4 =2 0 , and suppose that there are two possible mergers M1 = {1,3} and M2 = {2,4}
with cM1 =9and cM2 =8 . If the monopoly price for a ﬁrm with marginal cost equal to
5 is greater than 10 [i.e., pm(5) > 10], then with no mergers ﬁr m1w i l ls e tap r i c eo f1 0
and make all the sales in the market. The cost-increasing merger M1 is then CS-neutral in
isolation since the post-merger price will still be 10. Merger M2 is CS-increasing in isolation
because it reduces ﬁrm 1’s price from 10 to 8. However, once merger M2 occurs, merger M1
is CS-decreasing since it raises the price from 8 to 9.
This problem can be traced to the fact that a merger involving the lowest-cost ﬁrm ι(1|N)
that increases cost can be CS-neutral in the Bertrand model. We will say that a merger of the
ﬁrms in set M is cost increasing if the post-merger marginal cost of the merged entity, cM,i s
above the marginal cost of the most eﬃcient merger partner, i.e., cM > mini∈M ci.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
an antitrust authority can without loss reject any cost-increasing merger, since any such merger
both worsens eﬃciency and the extent of market power.18 We shall henceforth focus on an
antitrust authority that never approves cost-increasing mergers. Formally, this is equivalent
to supposing that feasible mergers are never cost increasing, an assumption that will allow us
to ﬁt the analysis into the same framework as the Cournot model.
The following result records some properties of mergers that do not increase cost:
Lemma 5 Consider a merger that does not increase cost among a subset M of ﬁrms in a
Bertrand market.
17Speciﬁcally, the limit of undominated equilibria for games with a discrete pricing grid, as the grid becomes
ﬁne.
18Formally, given any set of feasible mergers in a period, observe that it is possible to weakly improve consumer
surplus starting from any set of approved mergers by instead rejecting all mergers that are cost-increasing. As a
result, in any period, given any set of feasible mergers, the largest CS-maximizing set from among those feasible
mergers that do not increase cost maximizes consumer surplus in that period.
181. It is proﬁtable (it weakly increases the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms in M).
2. The merger is CS-decreasing only if it involves all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(1|N),a l lo ft h e
ﬁrms with cost cι(2|N),a n dm o r e o v e rpm(cM) >c ι(2|N).
Proof. In the Appendix.
Another important diﬀerence from the Cournot model is that a merger that is CS-increasing
may not be strictly proﬁtable: for example, a cost-reducing merger of ﬁrms ι(2|N) and ι(3|N)
that results in a cost above cι(1|N) lowers the market price but leaves ﬁrms ι(2|N) and ι(3|N)
with zero proﬁt after the merger. For this reason, part (ii) of Proposition 3 will not hold in
the Bertrand model [e.g., ﬁrms ι(2|N) and ι(3|N) in this example can optimally decide not to
propose their merger even if it is CS-increasing].
Nevertheless, part (i) of Proposition 3 does hold: all feasible mergers being proposed in each
period after any history is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms, and the equilibrium
outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers
F.T os e et h i s ,w eﬁrst consider the interaction between two disjoint mergers, M1 and M2.L e t
N denote the set of ﬁrms if neither merger takes place, Ni the set of ﬁrms after merger Mi (but
not Mj, j 6= i) has taken place, and N12 the set of ﬁrms after both mergers have taken place.
The key fact is that in the Bertrand model, versions of Propositions 1 and 2 that are suﬃcient
to establish part (i) of Proposition 3 continue to hold for mergers that do not increase cost:
Proposition 4 In the Bertrand model:
(i) if a merger that does not increase cost is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, it remains CS-
nondecreasing if another merger that does not increase cost and is CS-nondecreasing in
isolation takes place.
(ii) there cannot be two distinct mergers that do not increase cost and are CS-decreasing in
isolation.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 5 Consider two mergers M1 and M2 that are not cost increasing. Suppose that
merger M1 is CS-nondecreasing in isolation, while merger M2 is CS-decreasing in isolation but
CS-nondecreasing once merger M1 has taken place. Then:
(i) Merger M1 is CS-increasing conditional on merger M2 taking place;
(ii) The joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms involved in merger M1 is weakly larger if both mergers take
place than if neither merger takes place.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Proposition 5 diﬀers from Proposition 2 for the Cournot model only in that the proﬁtability
conclusions are weak rather than strict. Given Propositions 4 and 5, the basic arguments
leading to part (i) of Proposition 3 (now for mergers that do not increase cost) parallel those
for the Cournot model.
194.2 Diﬀerentiated Products
The Cournot and Bertrand analyses so far assumed a homogeneous product market. Unfortu-
nately, extending our main results to the case of diﬀerentiated products, and hence to multi-
product ﬁrms, is not straightforward. For example, think of the extreme case in which there are
two diﬀerentiated products in the market. A merger might leave overall consumer surplus un-
changed while raising one price and lowering the other. Since in the extreme case in which the
two products are independent in demand there are two independent homogeneous goods mar-
kets, we are not able to extend our arguments about the complementarity of CS-nondecreasing
mergers. On the other hand, our main results do extend to the case of diﬀerentiated products
if “strong symmetry” is imposed on both demand and costs (in the sense that all ﬁrms that
are involved in the same merger have identical marginal costs for all of their products, both
pre-merger and post-merger). In that case, price eﬀects for all goods move in the same direction
and the complementarity results from our previous analyses carry over, as we now discuss. In
our discussion, we will focus on the case of price competition with diﬀerentiated products.
Let Qj(pN) denote the demand for product j,w h e r epN is the vector of prices, and suppose
that the demand system is symmetric across products. Moreover, assume that demand is
downward-sloping and strictly log-concave in own price, products are demand substitutes,
prices are strategic complements, and the own-price eﬀect dominates the cross-price eﬀects in
t e r m so fb o t ht h el e v e lo fd e m a n da n di t ss l o p e . 19
For simplicity, suppose that, prior to merging, all ﬁrms produce a single product so that
ﬁrm j ∈ N produces product j ∈ N.A f t e r m e r g i n g , t h e ﬁrms in the set Mk produce all of
the products in Mk. We assume that, prior to merging, each ﬁrm j ∈ Mk faces the same
marginal cost cj = cMk while after the merger all products in Mk are produced at the same
marginal cost cMk. This assumption ensures that any equilibrium has the property that the
price of every product in the set Mk is always the same: p∗
i = p∗
Mk for i ∈ Mk (see Kühn and
Rimler [2006]). In particular, this means that we can think of each ﬁrm’s strategic variable
being one-dimensional, so the standard analysis of diﬀerentiated goods price competition with
single-product ﬁrms (see Vives [1999]) extends to our setting with multiproduct ﬁrms.
Consider a merger amongst active ﬁrms in set Mk,a n dl e tp∗
N denote the vector of pre-
merger equilibrium prices. Since prices are strategic complements, the merger is CS-neutral if
and only if it leaves all prices unchanged, so the threshold value of post-merger marginal cost































19The own eﬀect of price change dominates the cross eﬀects in terms of the level of demand
if
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, i ∈ N; see Kühn and Rimler [2006].
20The term Ψi is familiar from merger analysis: it is the “diversion ratio” from product i ∈ Mk to
other products in Mk,d e ﬁned as the share of the lost sales of product i ∈ Mk that are captured
by the other products in Mk after an increase in the price of product i. Since (by assumption)
∂Qi(p∗
N)/∂pi < 0 and ∂Qj(pN)/∂pi > 0 for j 6= i, and (from the ﬁrst-order condition of
proﬁt-maximization)
P
j∈Mk ∂Qj(pN)/∂pi < 0, i ∈ Mk,w eh a v eΨi ∈ (0,1), which implies
that b cMk <c Mk. That is, for the merger to be CS-neutral, the merger must be cost-reducing,
and therefore proﬁtable for the merging parties. Strategic complementarity implies that a
decrease in post-merger marginal cost cMk induces all prices to fall. Consequently, a merger
amongst active ﬁrms in Mk is CS-increasing if and only if cMk < b cMk, CS-neutral if and only
if cMk = b cMk, and CS-decreasing if and only if cMk > b cMk.
While every CS-neutral merger is proﬁtable, it is not straightforward to show that every CS-
nondecreasing merger is proﬁtable. The complication arises because a reduction in marginal
cost cMk has two opposing eﬀects on the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrm Mk:h o l d i n g ﬁxed the
prices of all other ﬁrms, the direct eﬀect of a decrease in cMk is to increase the merged ﬁrm’s
proﬁt; but the strategic eﬀect of a decrease in cMk is to reduce the merged ﬁrm’s proﬁta sa l l
other ﬁrms will decrease their prices in response. One therefore needs to impose conditions
on demand to ensure that the direct eﬀect outweighs the strategic eﬀect and a decrease in its
marginal cost raises that ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt. It is straightforward to check that this is
indeed the case, for example, when demand is linear, Qj(pN)=αN −βNpj +γN
P
i6=j pi with
αN > 0 and βN > (n − 1)γN > 0.
Let us now turn to the interaction between mergers. Our previous result on the comple-
mentarity of those mergers that change consumer surplus in the same direction (Proposition
2) carries over to the present setting if approving a CS-increasing merger Ml raises the thresh-
old b cMk for merger Mk, k 6= l (and approving a CS-decreasing Ml reduces b cMk). Since a
CS-increasing merger reduces all prices, this means that our complementarity result extends if
demand is such that b cMk(p∗
N) is weakly decreasing in all prices. In the case of linear demand,
for example, the diversion ratio Ψi is a constant, so b cMk(p∗
N) depends only on, and is strictly
decreasing in, p∗
Mk. It follows that complementarity holds. More generally, a suﬃcient condi-
tion for b cMk(p∗
N) to be nonincreasing in the prices of all products with positive sales is that
the diversion ratio Ψi is nondecreasing in all prices. Provided that this complementarity holds,
Proposition 3 extends to this setting.
4.3 Fixed Costs and Exit
So far, we have assumed that all ﬁxed costs are sunk, and that mergers had no eﬀect on
these costs. Our Cournot results extend to cases in which ﬁxed costs are present and possibly
aﬀected by mergers provided that (i) mergers that are CS-nondecreasing in isolation continue
to be proﬁtable in isolation and (ii) mergers do not cause active ﬁrms to shut down.20
Regarding (i), recall from Corollary 1 that, in the absence of ﬁxed costs, every CS-nondecreasing
merger is proﬁtable in isolation. This result continues to hold in the presence of ﬁxed costs,
provided that the post-merger ﬁx e dc o s to fam e r g e dﬁrm is not larger than the sum of the
pre-merger ﬁxed costs of the merger partners. In particular, our result is unaﬀected if mergers
generate eﬃciencies in ﬁxed costs as well as marginal costs.
20In the Bertrand model, all but one ﬁrm will exit if there are positive levels of ﬁxed costs.
21If (ii) is violated, Proposition 1 need not hold. For example, suppose both mergers M1 and
M2 are CS-increasing in isolation and do not induce any ﬁrm to exit. However, if both mergers
are approved, then some other ﬁrm j ∈ N\(M1 ∪ M2) might ﬁnd it optimal to exit. (This
outcome is possible since, without exit, the market price after both mergers would be lower
than after only one merger.) Taking the endogenous exit of ﬁrm j into account, consumer
surplus after both mergers might therefore be lower than after merger M1 only, in which case
merger M2 would be CS-decreasing conditional on merger M1. Thus, Proposition 1(i) may
fail to hold. In a similar vein, Motta and Vasconcelos [2005] allow for exit in a setting with
four symmetric ﬁrms and two possible disjoint cost-reducing mergers involving two ﬁrms each.
Each merger is CS-decreasing in isolation because it induces the other two, non-merging ﬁrms
to exit. But consumer surplus increases if both mergers are approved, implying that each
merger becomes CS-increasing once the other merger has taken place. Thus, Proposition 1(ii)
fails to hold in their model. As a result, a myopic policy need not be optimal.
While these observations suggest that in general our main results could break down in
the presence of ﬁxed costs and endogenous exit, we can allow for exit among a competitive
fringe of price-taking ﬁrms that do not take part in any mergers. To do so, we construct the
competitive fringe’s (long-run) supply function, SF(p), which takes potential exit (and entry)
of these ﬁrms into account. The residual demand of the large, strategic ﬁrms in set N is then
given by R(p) ≡ D(p)−SF(p),w h e r eD(p) is market demand. As long as the inverse residual
market demand function P(·) ≡ R−1(·) satisﬁes the conditions of Assumption 1, our analysis
and conclusions remain unchanged.
4.4 Merger Proposal Costs
In our analysis, we have assumed that there are no costs of proposing a merger to the antitrust
authority. Moreover, we have highlighted a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all feasible
mergers are always proposed, including some that have no chance of being approved. One
might be concerned that ﬁrms would not propose such mergers if they had even the tiniest
cost of making a merger proposal. However, since every CS-nondecreasing merger is strictly
proﬁtable (provided it results in an active ﬁrm), there is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium
in which, in every period and after any history, the mergers proposed are those that will be
approved in equilibrium (i.e., the mergers that are in the largest myopically CS-maximizing
set of mergers, given the current market structure) and result in an active ﬁrm. Since all of
these mergers are strictly proﬁtable, our conclusion — that, if the antitrust authority adopts the
most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, then every subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized F — would not change in
the presence of merger proposal costs, provided these are suﬃciently small.
4.5 Demand Shifts
While our model had a stationary demand function, Corollary 1 suggests that our main results
hold provided that demand is weakly declining over time. Speciﬁcally, suppose that inverse
demand in period t c a nb ew r i t t e na sP(Q;θt),w h e r eθt is the publicly observable demand
state realized at the beginning of period t (before mergers are proposed), which we assume is
22increasing over time, i.e., θt ≥ θt−1. For any tuple (Q;θt) such that P(Q;θt) > 0,w ec o n t i n u e
to assume that PQ < 0 and PQ + QPQQ < 0 (where subscripts denote partial derivatives);
moreover, we now assume that Pθ < 0 and PQθ ≥ 0. For example, these conditions hold
if inverse demand takes the form P(Q;θt) ≡ P(Q)/θt and P(Q) satisﬁes the conditions of
Assumption 1.
Let Q∗(At;θt) denote the equilibrium industry output when market structure is At and the
demand state is θt. Since inverse demand is changing over time, it is more convenient to write
b cM (the post-merger marginal cost threshold that makes a merger amongst active ﬁrms in set
M CS-neutral) as a function of equilibrium price rather than industry quantity:




where P∗(At;θt) ≡ P(Q∗(At;θt);θt). Our assumptions on demand ensure that, holding ﬁxed
market structure At, an increase in the demand state θt will lead to a decrease in the equilibrium
price P∗(At;θt).21 This, in turn, implies that, holding ﬁxed market structure At,t h ep o s t -
merger marginal cost threshold b cM(P∗(At;θt)) weakly increases over time (as long as the
merger involves active ﬁrms). As before, the threshold strictly increases as P∗(At;θt) decreases
due to CS-increasing mergers in the rest of the industry. Hence, if the antitrust authority adopts
a myopically CS-maxmizing merger policy, then if merger M is CS-nondecreasing in period t,
it will remain CS-nondecreasing in every future period t0 >t . (By contrast, a merger M that
is CS-decreasing in period t may now become CS-nondecreasing in some later period t0 >t
even holding market structure ﬁxed.)
The largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers now depends not only on the set
of proposed mergers Pt and current market structure At−1, but also on the demand state
θt, and is denoted A
∗
(Pt;θt|At−1). As the discussion above makes clear, A
∗
(Pt;θt|At−1) is
















.S i n c e Ft ⊆ Ft+1 and




(Ft+1;θt+1|∅). Hence, if all feasible but not-
yet-approved mergers are always proposed, then the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing
merger policy maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible
mergers F (Lemma 4). Moreover, as before, if the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient
myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, the resulting equilibrium outcome is dynamically
optimal (Proposition 3).
4.6 Entry
In our analysis above, we assumed that the set of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, except for mergers. Would
our conclusions change if we allowed for ﬁrm entry? Recall that our model implies that the
equilibrium price P(Q∗) falls weakly over time. This suggests that if a ﬁrm does not ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to enter the market at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, before any mergers have





Pθ(PQ + Q∗PQQ) − Q∗PQPQθ
(n +1 ) PQ + Q∗PQQ
,
where Q∗ is industry output and n is the number of active ﬁrms when the market structure is At and the
demand state is θt. Under our assumptions on demand, the expression on the right-hand side is strictly negative.
23become feasible, then this ﬁrm will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the market in any later period
(provided that its costs have not changed). That is, allowing for free entry of ﬁrms (with
unchanging costs) does not aﬀect our results.
Moreover, suppose that new ﬁrms periodically enter the market later, for example after
discovering how to make the product. (In our model, such an entry event is equivalent to
as u ﬃcient reduction in the marginal cost of a hitherto inactive ﬁrm.) These (potentially
stochastic) entry events lower the market price, and leave our main result unchanged for reasons
that parallel those in our discussion above of demand shifts.
4.7 Continuing Innovation
In the analysis above, we assumed that when a merger, say Mk, becomes feasible, the ﬁrms
in Mk receive a (random) draw of their post-merger marginal cost cMk once and for all; if
merger Mk is implemented, the marginal cost of the merged entity is cMk forever after. But
it seems plausible that, over time, ﬁrms involved in a (potential) merger may have more than
one idea of how to create synergies amongst them, both pre-merger and post-merger. As we
now discuss, it is possible to extend our analysis to allow for continuing innovation.
Consider the following generalization of our previous setup: as before, we assume that
if merger Mk becomes feasible at the beginning of period t, then the ﬁrms in Mk receive a
random draw of their post-merger marginal cost from distribution function Gkt.M o r e o v e r ,
we now assume that the post-merger marginal cost cMk follows a (discrete-time) stochastic
process from period t onward. The stochastic process governing these additional cost draws
(or “innovations”) is independent of whether the ﬁrms in Mk have already merged or not.
Crucially, we assume that the post-merger marginal cost cMk weakly decreases over time.
Our previous results carry over to this generalized setting. The arguments closely parallel
those in our discussion above of demand shifts. Since a reduction in merged ﬁrm Mk’s marginal
cost reduces the equilibrium price (and thereby reduces the post-merger marginal cost threshold
b cMl of every other merger Ml, l 6= k), the largest myopically CS-maximizing set of mergers
will weakly increase over time if the antitrust authority adopts the most lenient myopically
CS-maximizing merger policy. Hence, if all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are always
proposed, then the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy maximizes discounted
consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers F (Lemma 4). Moreover, the
induction argument in the proof of Proposition 3 continues to apply, showing that the resulting
equilibrium outcome is dynamically optimal.22
4.8 Aggregate Surplus Standard
In our analysis above, we have assumed that the antitrust authority’s objective is to maximize
discounted consumer surplus. Indeed, as pointed out in the Introduction, this is close to
being the legal standard in the U.S. and the EU. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask whether
22In our discussion, we have assumed that a merged ﬁrm’s post-merger marginal cost follows an exogenous
stochastic process that is weakly decreasing over time. It is straightforward to show that if the merged ﬁrm
has to make an active decision as to whether or not to implement a cost-reducing innovation, then it is indeed
proﬁtable for the merged ﬁrm to implement it.
24the antitrust authority can maximize aggregate surplus (AS) by adopting the most lenient
myopically AS-maximizing merger policy.
In the homogeneous-goods Bertrand model, the answer is, yes. One can prove that our
results on the interactions between mergers in the Bertrand model, Propositions 4 and 5,
continue to hold if we replace the consumer surplus criterion by the aggregate surplus criterion.
Consequently, under the most lenient myopically AS-maximizing merger policy there is an
equilibrium such that the resulting outcome maximizes discounted aggregate surplus for every
realized sequence of mergers F.
In the homogeneous-goods Cournot model, however, the complementarity of AS-increasing
mergers does not hold in general. To see this, recall that, in the Cournot model, a marginal
cost reduction by a highly ineﬃcient ﬁrm (one that produces almost no output, and thus
has a proﬁt margin approximately equal to zero) necessarily reduces aggregate surplus. In
contrast, a cost-reducing merger between the two most eﬃcient ﬁrms in a market may increase
aggregate surplus. Thus, complementarity can fail when a cost-reducing, AS-increasing merger
by other ﬁrms in the market transforms these two ﬁrms from being the most eﬃcient ﬁrms in
the market to being the least eﬃcient. In addition, mergers that increase aggregate surplus
need not be proﬁtable for the ﬁrms involved in them. The papers by Nilssen and Sorgard
[1998] and Matsushima [2001], for example, both focus on Cournot settings with linear demand
and constant marginal costs in which there are two possible mergers, each between a pair of
ﬁrms, and show that a myopic policy need not be optimal for an antitrust authority interested
in maximizing aggregate surplus.
4.9 Information of Firms
In our analysis, we have assumed that ﬁrms observe both their own and their rivals’ merger
possibilities, including their eﬃciencies, as soon as these become feasible. We now show that
the conclusion of Proposition 3 carries over to the case where ﬁrms observe the feasibility of
other mergers only when they are proposed, and observe the eﬃciency gains of other mergers
only when those mergers are approved. (We continue to assume that ﬁrms observe their own
merger possibility when it becomes feasible. We also continue to assume that each ﬁrm knows
the initial costs of all ﬁrms at the start of period 1, so that complete-information Cournot
competition in each period is justiﬁed.) To establish the result, we use the solution concept of
extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium.23
Proposition 6 Assume ﬁrms observe the feasibility of other mergers only when they are pro-
posed and the eﬃciency gains of other mergers only when they are approved, and that the
support of Gkt is ﬁnite for all k and t. Suppose the antitrust authority follows the most lenient
myopically CS-maximizing merger policy. Then:
(i) All feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any history is an extensive-form
trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms. In this equilibrium, the outcome
23We use this solution concept rather than the weaker notion of sequential equilibrium to establish part (ii) of
the result. The trembles ensure that following any history, when the true set of feasible but not-yet-approved
mergers is Ft\At−1, every proposer ﬁrm assigns a strictly positive probability to this set being the set of feasible
but not-yet-approved mergers.
25maximizes discounted consumer surplus for any realized sequence of feasible mergers
F =( F1,...,FT).
(ii) For each sequence F, every extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium results
in the same optimal sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.10 Breakups
Our results have implications not only for horizontal mergers but also for horizontal breakups
of companies into smaller ﬁrms. As we now discuss, the model of Section 2 can be applied to
the analysis of such breakups. Importantly, however, that application shows that a myopically
CS-maximizing breakup policy is not dynamically optimal.
To ﬁt breakups in the framework of Section 2, we think of the breakup of (merged) ﬁrm M
as being the reverse operation to merger M,w i t hcM being the pre-breakup marginal cost of
merged ﬁrm M and ci, i ∈ M, being the post-breakup marginal cost of ﬁrm i. Hence, breakup
of ﬁrm M is CS-neutral if and only if merger M is CS-neutral, and the breakup is CS-increasing
[CS-decreasing] if and only if the merger is CS-decreasing [CS-increasing].
Our dynamic optimality result for a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy does not
extend to breakups. Most importantly, a myopic breakup policy is, in general, path dependent,
and so may fail to be optimal even if if the antitrust authority does not need ﬁrms to propose
breakups. This path dependence arises because the complementarity result of Proposition 1
does not carry over to breakups. To see this point, consider the case in which there are two
ﬁrms, M1 and M2, each of whose breakup is CS-increasing in isolation. (Note that a breakup “in
isolation” means that the other ﬁrm is still merged). Our results regarding mergers in Section
2 imply that these breakups may not each be CS-increasing once the other breakup has taken
place: Speciﬁcally, note that breakups M1 and M2 each being CS-increasing in isolation is
equivalent to saying that each merger Mi is CS-decreasing once the other merger Mj (j 6= i)
has taken place. If so, one possibility is that one of the mergers, say M1, is CS-decreasing
in isolation, while the other merger, M2, is CS-increasing in isolation but CS-decreasing once
merger M1 has taken place.24 This means that while the breakup of ﬁrm M1 is CS-increasing
once ﬁrm M2 is broken up, the breakup of ﬁrm M2 is CS-decreasing once ﬁrm M1 is broken
up. As a result, there is path dependence: if the breakup of ﬁrm M2 is considered ﬁrst, both
breakups will be implemented, but if the breakup of ﬁrm M1 is considered ﬁrst, only ﬁrm M1
will be broken up. So a myopic policy fails in general to be optimal, even if the antitrust
authority does not need ﬁrms to propose breakups.
Moreover, if breakups do need to be proposed, the incentives of ﬁrms to propose them
are not aligned with those of an antitrust authority seeking to maximize discounted consumer
surplus, as can be seen from the fact that a CS-neutral breakup of an active ﬁrm is strictly
unproﬁtable for the ﬁrm. (This is simply the ﬂip-side of our result on the proﬁtability of a
CS-neutral merger.)
24The other possibility is that both mergers are CS-decreasing in isolation.
265C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed the antitrust authority’s optimal dynamic merger approval
policy in a model with Cournot competition in which merger opportunities arise stochastically
over time, ﬁrms decide whether or not to propose a feasible merger, and the antitrust authority
decides whether or not to approve proposed mergers. We ﬁrst established that a form of
complementarity exists between mergers in this Cournot setting: speciﬁcally, the sign of a
merger’s consumer surplus eﬀect is unchanged if another merger whose consumer surplus eﬀect
has the same sign takes place. This result, which is of independent interest, set the stage for our
main result, which showed that, in our model, an antitrust authority who wishes to maximize
discounted consumer surplus can implement the dynamically optimal solution by adopting a
completely myopic policy according to which the antitrust authority approves a merger if and
only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. In fact, the
antitrust authority cannot improve upon the outcome induced by the myopic policy even if it
has perfect foresight about potential future mergers.
The argument for this surprising conclusion came in two parts. First, ignoring ﬁrms’ pro-
posal incentives and assuming that all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are always pro-
posed, a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is dynamically optimal in that it maximizes
discounted consumer surplus for every realized sequence of feasible mergers. As we have shown,
this result is based on a fundamental complementarity in the consumer surplus eﬀect of merg-
ers: if each of two mergers share the same sign of their consumer surplus eﬀect, then the sign
of each one’s consumer surplus eﬀect does not change if the other merger is implemented. This
complementarity result follows because an increase in the toughness of competition (due to
the approval of a price-reducing merger) does not aﬀect the “eﬃciency eﬀect” of a merger but
reduces its “market power eﬀect,” implying that the merger is more likely to be CS-increasing
the more competitive is the industry. It implies that the antitrust authority will never later
regret approval of a CS-nondecreasing merger. Moreover, the fact that rejected mergers can
always be proposed and approved later means that the antitrust authority will never later
regret rejection of a CS-decreasing merger.
Second, if the antitrust authority adopts a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy, then
ﬁrms’ proposal incentives are aligned with the interests of the antitrust authority: every merger
that the antitrust authority wishes to approve is indeed proﬁt a b l ef o rt h em e r g e rp a r t n e r se v e n
if the approval of that merger induces the approval of other (price-reducing) mergers in the
same period or in subsequent periods.
One interesting side implication of our model is that it provides a novel theory of merger
waves (for example, see Fauli-Oller [2000]). In contrast to much of the existing literature
(e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau [2002, 2008]), our explanation of merger waves does not rely on
aggregate shocks. Speciﬁcally, because of the complementarity of CS-nondecreasing mergers in
our model, the arrival of a CS-increasing merger opportunity for some ﬁrms may have a domino
eﬀect by turning other feasible but currently CS-decreasing mergers into CS-nondecreasing
mergers, and thereby triggering a merger wave. An interesting aspect of this result is the
way in which the antitrust authority’s CS-maximizing merger policy aﬀects the emergence of
merger waves, since complementarity of mergers does not hold in general absent this antitrust
review.
27We have also shown that our main conclusion — the dynamic optimality of a myopic merger
approval policy — is robust in several dimensions. For instance, the conclusion does not depend
on ﬁrms’ and the antitrust authority’s information about potential future mergers nor on
whether ﬁrms compete in prices or quantities.
Perhaps the most important limitation of our model is that mergers are disjoint. This rules
out, for example, the possibility that a ﬁrm may have to choose between two merger partners,
or that a recently merged ﬁrm might consider merging with another still-independent ﬁrm.
While disjointness of possible mergers would hold when ﬁrms have natural merger partners (as
we noted earlier), and has been assumed throughout the small existing literature on antitrust
review of mergers in dynamic settings (Nilssen and Sorgard [1998], Matsushima [2001], Motta
and Vasconcelos [2005]), it is clearly a strong assumption.
Nondisjoint mergers can cause problems for myopic policies. A ﬁrst problem is that myopic
approval of a CS-increasing merger today may preclude the possibility of approving an even
better merger tomorrow. A second problem relates to ﬁrms’ proposal incentives. With disjoint
mergers, we saw that ﬁrms’ proposal incentives were aligned with the desires of the antitrust
authority because any CS-nondecreasing merger was proﬁtable. When ﬁrms must choose among
merger partners, however, they may propose the wrong merger from the antitrust authority’s
perspective (e.g., the most proﬁtable merger may not be the one that is best for consumer
surplus). Another issue is that ﬁrms may face a disincentive to propose a merger that today
would be CS-increasing because of the eﬀect the merger’s approval would have on bargaining
with future merger partners.
Nonetheless, because the case of nondisjoint mergers leads to such a striking result — the
optimality of myopic merger policy — we feel that it is a natural starting point for understanding
the issues involved in optimal merger policy in dynamic environments. At the same time, in
our own future research, we hope to learn more about what can be said about optimal merger
policy in settings with nondisjoint mergers.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs
We begin by establishing two useful results concerning the interactions among sets of merg-
ers. The ﬁrst lemma focuses on the relationship between sequences of mergers that are
CS-nondecreasing at each step, and sets of mergers for which each merger is CS-nondecreasing
given all of the other mergers in the set. We call it the “Incremental Gain Lemma”:
Lemma 6 (Incremental Gain Lemma)
(i) Suppose that a set of mergers M ≡ {M1,...,MJ1} has the property that every merger
M ∈ M is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in M (those in the set M\M)
have taken place. Then for any strict subset Y ⊂ M, there exists an M0 ∈ M\Y that is
CS-nondecreasing if all of the mergers in Y have taken place. As a result, starting from
Y , there is a sequencing of the mergers in M\Y that is CS-nondecreasing at each step.
(ii) Suppose that a sequence of mergers M1,...,MJ1 is CS-nondecreasing at each step.
Then each merger M ∈ M ≡ {M1,...,MJ1} is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers
in M (those in the set M\M) have taken place.
Proof. ( i )S u p p o s et h er e s u l ti sn o tt r u e ,s ot h a te v e r yM0 ∈ M\Y is CS-decreasing if all of
the mergers in Y have taken place. Proposition 1(ii) implies that, taking the mergers in Y
as given, for any sequencing of the mergers in the set M\Y the merger implemented at each
step, including the last step, is CS-decreasing. But this contradicts the hypothesis that the last
29merger in the sequence is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in the set M have taken
place.
Given the existence of M0 ∈ M\Y that is CS-nondecreasing if all of the mergers in Y have
taken place, we can update the subset Y to Y ∪{M0} ⊂ M and apply the same argument again.
Continuing iteratively identiﬁes a sequencing of the mergers in M\Y that is CS-nondecreasing
at each step starting from the subset Y .
(ii) Consider an arbitrary merger Mj in sequence M1,...,MJ1. We will show that Mj is CS-
nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in M\Mj have taken place. For k ≥ j,d e ﬁne the
set Mk = {Mi : i ≤ k}. Suppose that (ak)m e r g e rMj is CS-nondecreasing given Mk\Mj and
that (bk) merger Mk+1 is CS-nondecreasing given Mk. Observe that, by hypothesis, property
(ak)i st r u ef o rk = j, and that property (bk)h o l d sf o ra l lk. We claim that properties (ak)a n d
(bk)i m p l yp r o p e r t y( ak+1): Mj is CS-nondecreasing given Mk+1\Mj. To see this, observe that
if merger Mk+1 is CS-nondecreasing given Mk\Mj, property (ak+1) follows from Proposition
1(i), while if merger Mk+1 is CS-decreasing given Mk\Mj then property (ak+1) follows from
Proposition 2(i) [and the fact that Mk+1 is CS-nondecreasing given Mk]. Applying induction
we ﬁnd that merger Mj is CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in M\Mj have taken
place [property (aJ1)].
Part (ii) of Lemma 6 implies that the set of mergers resulting from a merger policy in which
the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-by-step fashion, approving
mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no further CS-
nondecreasing mergers can be identiﬁed, possesses the property that every merger in the set
is CS-nondecreasing given every other merger in the set. This is also a property possessed by
any myopically CS-maximizing set (if any approved merger M were CS-decreasing given the
other approved mergers, then consumer surplus could be increased by not approving merger
M while continuing to approve the others). The next lemma establishes two features of sets
possessing this property.
Lemma 7 Suppose that two distinct sets of mergers M1 ≡ {M1,...,MJ1} and M2 ≡ {M1,...,MJ2}
with M1 * M2, not necessarily disjoint, each have the property that every merger M ∈ Mi is
CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in Mi (those in the set Mi\M) have taken place.
Then:
(i) there is a merger M0
1 ∈ M1\ (M1 ∩ M2) that is CS-nondecreasing given that all of the
mergers in M2 have taken place;
(ii) the set of mergers M1 ∪ M2 results in a level of consumer surplus that is at least as
g r e a ta st h a to fe i t h e rs e tM1 or set M2.
Proof. (i) Part (i) of the Incremental Gain Lemma [Lemma 6(i)] implies that there exists a
merger M0
1 ∈ M1\(M1∩M2) that is CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in M1∩M2
have taken place. It also implies that there is a sequencing of the mergers in M2\(M1 ∩ M2),
say M21,...,M2J2, that is CS-nondecreasing at each step, given that the mergers in M1 ∩ M2
have taken place. Let Mk = {M2i : i ≤ k}. Proposition 1(i) implies that if merger M0
1
is CS-nondecreasing given that all the mergers in (M1 ∩ M2) ∪ Mk have taken place, then
[since by hypothesis merger M2,k+1 is also CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers in
(M1 ∩ M2) ∪ Mk have taken place] M0
1 is also CS-nondecreasing given that all of the mergers
in (M1 ∩ M2) ∪ Mk+1 have taken place. Since merger M0
1 is CS-nondecreasing if all of the
30mergers in (M1 ∩ M2) ∪ M0 =( M1 ∩ M2) have taken place, applying induction yields the
result (taking k = J1).
(ii) Let M0
1 be the merger identiﬁed in part (i). We argue ﬁrst that every merger in
set M2 ∪ {M0
1} is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in that set have taken place.
P a r t( i )i m p l i e st h a tt h i si st r u ef o rm e r g e rM0
1. Now consider any merger M0
2 ∈ M2.B y
hypothesis, merger M0
2 is CS-nondecreasing given that all the mergers in set M2\M0
2 have
t a k e np l a c e . I fm e r g e rM0
1 is also CS-nondecreasing if all of the mergers in set M2\M0
2 have
taken place, then Proposition 1(i) implies that merger M0
2 is CS-nondecreasing if all of the
mergers in (M2\M0
2) ∪ {M0
1} =( M2 ∪ {M0
1})\M0
2 have taken place. If, instead, merger M0
1
is CS-decreasing if all of the mergers in set M2\M0
2 have taken place, then Proposition 2(i)
implies that this same property holds. This establishes that every merger in M2 ∪ {M0
1} is
CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in that set have taken place. Moreover, the level
of consumer surplus with set M2 ∪ {M0
1} is at least as large as with set M2.
If M1 ⊆ M2 ∪{M0
1} then the result is proven. Suppose not. Then note that sets M1 and
M2 ∪ {M0
1} satisfy the hypotheses of the Lemma. So we can apply the argument again for
these two sets. Continuing iteratively in this fashion we establish the result by adding to M2
a sequencing of the mergers in M1\(M1 ∩ M2) that is CS-nondecreasing at each step. This
establishes that the level of consumer surplus is at least as high with set M1 ∪M2 as with set
M2. We also need to show that the level of consumer surplus in M1 ∪ M2 is at least as large
as in set M1.I f M1 ⊇ M2,s ot h a tM1 ∪ M2 = M1, this follows immediately. If instead
M1 + M2, then we can repeat the argument above with the roles of M1 and M2 reversed to
establish the result.
We now use these results to prove Lemmas 2 and 3.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . G i v e np r o p o s e dm e r g e r sPt and market structure At−1,l e tA0 be a
largest myopically CS-maximizing set and let A 6= A0 be a myopically CS-maximizing set. We
will show that A ⊂ A0. Suppose otherwise, so that A0 ⊂ (A ∪ A0).T h es e t sA and A0 satisfy
the hypothesis of Lemma 7. So, by Lemma 7(ii), A∪A0 is myopically CS-maximizing as well,
contradicting the assumption that A0 is a largest myopically CS-maximizing set for Pt given
market structure At−1. Hence, A0 must contain every other myopically CS-maximizing set,
which also implies that A0 is the unique largest CS-maximizing set.













t|At−1) satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 7 and, since A
∗
(Pt|At−1) ⊆ Pt ∪ At−1⊂ P
0
t ∪
At−1, all mergers in set A
∗
(Pt|At−1) are feasible when the set of proposed mergers is P0
t.
T h u s ,w h e nt h es e to fp r o p o s e dm e r g e r si sP0












t|At−1) being the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for P0
t given market structure
At−1.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that the set of proposed mergers is Pt and the market structure
prior to period t is At−1.L e t A⊆Pt denote a set of mergers resulting from a merger policy
in which the antitrust authority considers mergers within period t in a step-by-step fashion,
approving mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the current market structure until no
further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identiﬁed. By part (ii) of Lemma 6 (the Incremental
Gain Lemma), every merger in A must be CS-nondecreasing given every other merger in the set.
31If A * A
∗
(Pt|At−1), then Lemma 7(ii) implies that the set A∪A
∗
(Pt|At−1) is also myopically
CS-maximizing but strictly contains set A
∗
(Pt|At−1), a contradiction to A
∗
(Pt|At−1) being
the largest myopically CS-maximizing set for Pt given market structure At−1. Hence, A ⊆
A
∗
(Pt|At−1).I fA ⊂ A
∗
(Pt|At−1), Lemma 7(i) implies that once the mergers in A have been






(Pt|At−1)\A that is CS-
nondecreasing given that the mergers in A have taken place, contradicting A being the result
of a step-by-step merger policy that approves mergers that are CS-nondecreasing given the
current market structure until no further CS-nondecreasing mergers can be identiﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 5. To see Property 1, note that, in equilibrium, only a uniquely lowest-cost
ﬁrm (a ﬁrm that is the only one to have cost cι(1|N)) can make a positive proﬁtb e f o r et h e
merger. Hence, Property 1 can fail to hold only if the merger involves a ﬁrm that is the unique
ﬁrm with cost cι(1|N). Suppose it involves such a ﬁrm. In that case, a merger that does not
increase cost will not aﬀect the equilibrium prices of the ﬁrms not involved in the merger (who
price at cost both before and after the merger), so the merger must be weakly proﬁtable.
To see Property 2, let N denote the set of ﬁrms after the merger. Assume the merger is
CS-decreasing, i.e.,
pι(1|N) =m i n {pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} > min{pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} = pι(1|N). (10)
Since the merger is not cost increasing, cι(1|N) ≤ cι(1|N),s ot h a tpm(cι(1|N)) ≤ pm(cι(1|N)).
Note, ﬁrst, that the merger must involve at least one ﬁrm with cost cι(1|N): if not, then
since it is not cost increasing, cι(2|N) ≤ cι(2|N), which would yield a contradiction.to (10)
Next, note that if the merger involves some but not all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(1|N),t h e n
since it is not cost increasing, we have cι(2|N) = cι(1|N) ≤ cι(2|N). This would imply that
min{pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} ≤ min{pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)}, which contradicts (10), so the merger
must involve all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(1|N). Next, if the merger does not involve all of
the ﬁrms with cost cι(2|N), then since it involves all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(1|N) and is not
cost increasing, it must again be that cι(2|N) ≤ cι(2|N), which again yields a contradiction.
Hence, the merger must involve all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(1|N) and all of the ﬁrms with
cost cι(2|N). Finally, suppose that pm(cM) ≤ cι(2|N), or equivalently, pm(cι(1|N)) ≤ cι(2|N).
Since the merger is not cost increasing, pm(cι(1|N)) ≤ pm(cι(1|N)). But this implies that
pι(1|N) =m i n {pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} ≤ min{pm(cι(1|N)),c ι(2|N)} = pι(1|N), a contradiction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . To see part (i), suppose to the contrary that the merger, say
M1, becomes CS-decreasing if the other merger, say M2, takes place. Since M1 is not cost
increasing, by Lemma 5 the merger must involve (after M2 has taken place) all of the ﬁrms
with cost cι(1|N2) and all of the ﬁrms with cost cι(2|N2),a n dm o r e o v e rpm(cM1) >c ι(2|N2).
Because mergers are disjoint and M2 does not increase cost, this implies that when done in
isolation, merger M1 involves all of the ﬁrms with costs of either cι(1|N) or cι(2|N).I fs o ,t h e n
cι(2|N) = cι(2|N2). But this implies that pm(cM1) >c ι(2|N),s ot h a tm e r g e rM1 is CS-decreasing
in isolation, a contradiction.
To see part (ii), note that if a merger Mi is CS-decreasing in isolation, by Lemma 5 it must
involve (when done in isolation) all of the ﬁrms with costs of cι(1|N) and all the ﬁrms with cost
cι(2|N) . However, since mergers are disjoint, there cannot be two distinct mergers with this
property.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
32The proof of part (i) is identical to the proof of Proposition 2, except that in the Bertrand
model a CS-increasing merger, while proﬁtable, need not be strictly so.
To see part (ii), consider implementing merger M2 ﬁrst, followed by merger M1. Note that
since M2 is CS-decreasing in isolation it involves all of the ﬁrms with costs equal to cι(1|N) or
cι(2|N) by Lemma 5. Since it is not cost increasing, the proﬁto fa l lﬁrms not involved in this
merger, including all of those in M1, must be zero before and after merger M2 takes place.
Since merger M1 is proﬁtable after merger M2 takes place [by part (i)], the sequence of mergers
cannot decrease the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrms in M1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . To consider extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibria
we perturb the game by introducing a minimum and a maximum probability of a merger
proposal at any information set of a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger. We
examine Nash equilibrium behavior in the agent normal form as these minimum and maximum
probabilities approach zero and one, respectively.
(i) We will ﬁrst establish that all feasible mergers being proposed in each period after any
history is an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium for the ﬁrms. Combined
with Lemma 3, this yields part (i) of the proposition. To do so, it suﬃces to examine perturbed
games in which at every information set of a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger
the merger must be proposed with a probability of at least ε>0 and not more than 1 − ε,
where ε → 0.
The proof is by induction and follows closely that of Proposition 3. Consider, a period t in
which the history prior to period t’s proposal stage consists of the sequences Ft =( F1,...,Ft)
of feasible mergers, Pt−1 =( P1,...,Pt−1) of proposed mergers, and At−1 =( A1,...,At−1) of
approved mergers. Note that this history also determines exactly each ﬁrm i’s observed history,
which we denote by It
i. Formally, each It
i corresponds to an information set for ﬁrm i at the
proposal stage in period t.T h em o s ti m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence to the proof of Proposition 3 is that
the induction hypothesis is now that for any period T<T , starting in period t+1all feasible
but not-yet-approved mergers will be proposed in every period with the maximum possible
probability 1 − ε.
To show that proposing its merger with the maximum possible probability is optimal in
period t for every proposer ﬁrm with a feasible but-not-yet approved merger, consider proposer
ﬁrm i at an information set It
i with a feasible but not-yet-approved merger Mk. Recall from
the proof of Proposition 3 that, for a given information set It
i and a given set of other proposed
mergers b P−k, either the merger Mk is not approved when proposed (and so proposing the
merger has no eﬀect on current proﬁts), or the merger is approved when proposed but the
merged ﬁrm is inactive (and so, again, proposing the merger has no eﬀect on current proﬁts),
or the merger is approved and results in an active ﬁrm (in which case there is a strictly positive
eﬀect on current proﬁts). In the ﬁrst case (i.e., the merger is not approved when proposed),
there is also no eﬀect on future proﬁts of proposing the merger given the induction hypothesis.
The same is true in the second case (when the merger is approved but results in an inactive
ﬁrm). In the third case (where the merger is approved and results in an active ﬁrm), however,
there might be an eﬀect on future proﬁts if t<T.B u tt h i se ﬀect is continuous in the size of
the tremble ε, and (as is clear from the proof of Proposition 3) is equal to zero if ε =0 .S i n c e
there are at most a ﬁnite number of such information sets It
i and sets b P−k, there exists an
εt > 0 such that for all ε ≤ εt, proposing a feasible and not-yet-approved merger that ends up
33b e i n ga p p r o v e da n dr e s u l t si na na c t i v eﬁrm in period t is strictly proﬁtable. Hence, for ε ≤ εt,
proposing every feasible and not-yet-approved merger in period t is proﬁtable. The same is
clearly true if t = T,w h e r et h e r ei sn oe ﬀect on future proﬁts.
We conclude that our induction hypothesis — that all feasible and not-yet approved mergers
will be proposed in the future with the maximum possible probability — holds when we look
at period t −1 provided that ε ≤ εt =m i n τ≥t ετ. Applying induction starting in period T −1
implies that proposing every feasible but not-yet-approved merger in every period with the
maximum possible probability is a Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form of any perturbed
game with ε ≤ ε1. Hence, taking ε → 0, proposal of every feasible but not-yet-approved merger
in every period is an extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium.
(ii) We next show that every extensive-form trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium max-
imizes discounted consumer surplus (and results in the same sequence of period-by-period
consumer surpluses) for each sequence of feasible mergers F. To establish this result, we re-
strict attention to small perturbations in which the minimum probability of a merger proposal
at any information set for a proposer of a feasible but not-yet-approved merger is no more than
ε1 > 0 (where ε1 is deﬁned as above) and the maximum probability is no less than 1−ε1.W e
examine Nash equilibrium behavior in the agent normal form as the minimum and maximum
probabilities approach zero and one, respectively.
We now show that if the perturbations are strictly positive but suﬃciently small (in the
sense deﬁned above), then if the true set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers in period
t is Ft\At−1, every merger in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 will be proposed with the maximum
possible probability in that period. [Recall that the set A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1),d e ﬁned in the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 ( i i ) ,i st h es e to fm e r g e r si nA
∗
(Ft\At−1|At−1) that result in active ﬁrms
given the market structure A
∗
(Ft\At−1|At−1).] The result follows as we let the minimum and
maximum proposal probabilities go to zero and one, respectively.
The proof is by induction. The induction hypothesis for period t is that in all future periods
τ>t , whenever the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers is Fτ\Aτ−1,t h e na l lm e r g e r s
in A
∗
1(Fτ\Aτ−1|Aτ−1)\Aτ−1 are proposed with the maximum possible probability.
Suppose that Ft\At−1 is indeed the true set of feasible and not-yet-approved mergers. Let
It(Ft\At−1) denote those information sets in period t that are consistent with Ft\At−1;t h a ti s ,
these are the information sets that are reached for at least one sequence (Ft,Pt−1) of feasible
mergers and merger proposals that, given the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger
policy, results in the set of feasible but not-yet-proposed mergers in period t being Ft\At−1.
Consider any information set It
i ∈ It(Ft\At−1) that belongs to the proposer of a merger Mk ∈ (
Ft\At−1) such that Mk ∈ A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1. From our earlier argument, if all minimum
proposal probabilities are less than or equal to ε1 and all maximum proposal probabilities are
larger than or equal to 1−ε1, proposing merger Mk never reduces the expected joint discounted
proﬁts of the ﬁrms in Mk. We now show that proposing merger Mk is in fact strictly proﬁtable
in expectation.
Observe, ﬁrst, that in any Nash equilibrium of the agent normal form of the perturbed
game, the information set It
i is reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path
when the set of feasible but not-yet-proposed mergers in period t is Ft\At−1, so (in belief
language) the agent choosing at this information set must assign a strictly positive probability
34to Ft\At−1 being the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers.25
Th erest of the argument follows closely, with some diﬀerences, the proof of Proposition
3(ii): Starting from At−1, there is an ordering of the mergers in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1
that is CS-nondecreasing at each step, which we denote by (M1,...,MS). A si nt h ep r o o fo f
Proposition 3(ii), consider the proposal of merger Mk at It
i and suppose that all mergers Ms
for s<kare proposed with maximum probability when Ft\At−1 is the true set of feasible
and not-yet-approved mergers in period t. (Note that this assumption is valid when k =1 .)
Now, given the trembles, the proposer of Mk at It
i must assign a strictly positive probability
to the event that the realized set of proposed mergers is b Pt = {M1,...,M k}. As in the proof
of Proposition 3(ii), in this case all of these mergers will be approved and will result in active
ﬁrms. Hence, the proposer of Mk at It
i must believe that, if proposed, merger Mk will be
a p p r o v e da n dr e s u l ti na na c t i v eﬁrm with strictly positive probability. But from our previous
argument, if merger Mk is approved and the merged ﬁrm Mk is active, proposal of the merger
is strictly proﬁtable when the perturbations are small (in the sense described above). Applying
induction starting at k =1 , we see that any such merger Mk will be proposed in period t with
the maximum possible probability. Thus, if Ft\At−1 is the true set of feasible and not-yet-
approved mergers, all mergers in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 will be proposed with the maximum
possible probability.
Applying induction, we conclude that in any perturbed game if the true set of feasible but
not-yet-approved mergers in period t is Ft\At−1, then every merger in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1
will be proposed with the maximum possible probability in that period. Taking the perturba-
tions to zero yields the result.
6.2 Sketch of Arguments Underlying Remark 2
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w eb r i e ﬂy sketch the arguments leading to our claim in Remark 2. To do so,
we need to extend many of the results in the text. To refer to these additional results, we will
append a prime to the number of the result it extends. For example, the result that extends
Proposition 2 will be denoted Proposition 2’.
6.2.1 CS Eﬀects of and Interactions Between Mergers
Mirroring the statement of Proposition 1, Proposition 1’ states: (i) If a merger M1 is CS-
increasing (and hence proﬁtable) in isolation, it remains CS-increasing (and hence proﬁtable)
if another merger M2 that is CS-nondecreasing in isolation takes place and the merged ﬁrm
M1 remains active after merger M2 has taken place. (ii) If a merger M1 is CS-nonincreasing
in isolation and results in an active ﬁrm, then the merger remains CS-nonincreasing if another
merger M2 that is CS-nonincreasing in isolation takes place. The proof of part (i) of the
proposition uses the fact for M1 to be CS-increasing after merger M2 takes place, the merged
ﬁrm M1 must also be active if merger M2 does not take place, and follows a similar argument
as in the proof of Proposition 1(i). The proof of part (ii) of the proposition uses the fact
25This property — that any ﬁrm with a merger in Ft\At−1 must always assign a strictly positive probability
to Ft\At−1 being the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers — is a key step of the argument. It would
not be true without the perturbations and is the reason why perturbations are needed for ensuring the proposal
of all mergers in A
∗
1(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1.
35that if the merged ﬁrm M1 is active in isolation, it must remain active after merger M2 has
taken place since the CS-nondecreasing merger M2 weakly increases the equilibrium price;
moreover, the CS-nondecreasing merger M2 weakly decreases the threshold value of post-
merger marginal cost, b cM1,t h a tm a k e sm e r g e rM1 just CS-neutral, and so merger M1 must
remain CS-nondecreasing if M2 takes place.
In Proposition 2’, the hypothesis is that merger M1 is CS-increasing [rather than CS-
nondecreasing, as in Proposition 2] in isolation, while merger M2 is CS-nonincreasing [rather
than CS-decreasing] in isolation but CS-increasing once merger M1 has taken place. Under
this modiﬁed hypothesis, the statements of parts (i) and (ii) remain unchanged. The proof of
the proposition proceeds along the same lines as that of Proposition 2, except for some small
modiﬁcations. For instance, in the second sentence of the proof of part (i) “weakly increases”
is replaced by “strictly increases” and “nonnegative” by “strictly positive.”
Lemma 6’ (the modiﬁed Incremental Gain Lemma) diﬀers from Lemma 6 in that “CS-
nondecreasing” is replaced everywhere by “CS-increasing.” For instance, the set M in part (i)
has the property that every merger M ∈ M is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in M
have taken place. As a result, starting from any strict subset Y ⊂ M, there exists a sequencing
of the mergers in M\Y that is CS-increasing at each step. The proof uses the fact that, under
the hypothesis of the lemma, every merger M ∈ M must result in an active ﬁrm, for any
set A ⊆ M of approved mergers.26 This means that we can apply part (i) of Proposition 1’
and use the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 6 (but with “CS-decreasing” being
replaced by “CS-nonincreasing”, and so on). As for part (ii) of Lemma 6’, we need to add the
assumption that every merger in the sequence remains active when all of the other mergers in
the sequence have taken place. That is, the statement now reads: Suppose that a sequence of
mergers M1,...,MJ1 is CS-increasing at each step. Then each merger M ∈ M ≡ {M1,...,MJ1}
is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in M (those in the set M\M) have taken place,
provided that each merged ﬁrm M remains active after the mergers in M\M.
To obtain Lemma 7’ from Lemma 7, the hypothesis is modiﬁed so that the set M1 has the
property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing if all of the other mergers in that set
have taken place, while the set M2 continues to have the property that every merger in the
set is CS-nondecreasing if all of the other mergers in that set have taken place. Lemma 7’
states that if M1 * M2 a n di fe a c ho ft h em e r g e r si ns e tM1\(M1 ∩ M2) ( w h e nd o n eo ni t s
o w n )r e s u l t si na na c t i v eﬁrm once all of the mergers in set M2 have taken place, then there
exists a merger M0
1 ∈ M1\(M1 ∩M2) that is CS-increasing [rather than CS-nondecreasing, as
in Lemma 7(i)] given that all of the mergers in M2 have taken place. The proof ﬁrst identiﬁes
am e r g e rM0
1 ∈ M1\(M1 ∩ M2) that is CS-increasing given that the mergers in (M1 ∩ M2)
have taken place. If M0
1 would be not be a merger among active ﬁrms once the mergers in
M2 have taken place, then it must be CS-increasing once the mergers in M2 have taken place
(since it results in an active ﬁrm). If, instead, M0
1 would be a merger among active ﬁrms once
the mergers in M2 have taken place, then an induction argument along the same lines as that
in the proof of part (i) of Lemma 7 (now using Proposition 1’) establishes the result. Note
that a suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o re a c ho ft h em e r g e r si ns e tM1\(M1 ∩ M2) to result in an active
ﬁrm once all of the mergers in set M2 have taken place is that consumer surplus under set M1
26By Lemma 6(i), the price after the mergers in set A have taken place can be no higher than the price after
all of the mergers in set M have taken place.
36is at least as large as under set M2; that is, letting p∗
i denote the equilibrium price after all of
the mergers in set Mi, i =1 ,2, have taken place, if we have p∗
2 ≥ p∗
1.T os e e t h i s ,n o t e t h a t
every merged ﬁrm M ∈ M1 must have a cost cM <p ∗
1 since, otherwise, the merger would not
be CS-increasing given the other mergers in set M1.B u t t h e n cM <p ∗
2, which implies that
merger M results in an active ﬁrm once all of the mergers in set M2 have taken place. [A
counterpart to Lemma 7(ii) is not necessary for our purposes here.]
6.2.2 Myopically CS-maximizing Sets
In analog to the largest myopically CS-maximizing set, we can deﬁne a smallest myopically
CS-maximizing set for the set of proposed mergers Pt given current market structure At−1,a s
a myopically CS-maximizing set that does not contain any other myopically CS-maximizing
set.
Lemma 2’ makes the same uniqueness claim as Lemma 2, but for the smallest myopically
CS-maximizing set rather than for A
∗
(Pt|At−1): there is a unique smallest myopically CS-
maximizing set, denoted A
∗(Pt|At−1). (In contrast to Lemma 2, no monotonicity claim is
made.) The proof of the uniqueness property is by contradiction. Suppose there are two
smallest myopically CS-maximizing sets, say A and A
0,w i t hA 6= A
0. Without loss of generality,
suppose that A * A
0. Since each one of the sets must have the property that every merger in
the set is CS-increasing given the other mergers in that set and since the two sets must induce
the same level of consumer surplus, we can apply Lemma 7’ to show that there exists a merger
M0 ∈ A\(A ∩ A
0) that is CS-increasing given that all of the mergers in A
0 have taken place.
But then A
0 cannot be a myopically CS-maximizing set, a contradiction.
The following result shows that the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set is contained
in any other myopically CS-maximizing set, and that any myopically CS-maximizing set is
contained in the largest myopically CS-maximizing set:
Lemma 8 For a given proposed set of mergers, Pt, and current market structure At−1,t h e







Proof. We have already established the second inclusion property in Lemma 2. We therefore
turn to the ﬁrst inclusion property, A
∗(Pt|At−1) ⊆ A
∗
t(Pt|At−1).L e t A0 ⊆ A∗
t(Pt|At−1)
denote the set of all those mergers in A∗
t(Pt|At−1) that are CS-neutral given the other mergers
in A∗
t(Pt|At−1),a n dl e tA+ ≡ A∗
t(Pt|At−1)\A0 denote the complementary set, which has the
property that every merger M ∈ A+ is CS-increasing given the other mergers in A+. We claim
that A
∗(Pt|At−1) ⊆ A
+.[ I nf a c t ,A+ = A
∗(Pt|At−1), but we do not need to show this.] To
see this, suppose otherwise that A
∗(Pt|At−1) * A
+. Since each set, A+ and A
∗(Pt|At−1),i s
myopically CS-maximizing and has the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing
given the other mergers in that set, we can apply Lemma 7’ to conclude that there exists






that is CS-increasing given that all of
the mergers in A+ have taken place. But then A+ cannot be myopically CS-maximizing, a
contradiction. Hence, we have A
∗(Pt|At−1) ⊆ A
+, which implies A
∗(Pt|At−1) ⊆ A∗
t(Pt|At−1).
37An immediate implication of Lemma 8 is that we can think of set A∗
t(Pt|At−1) as con-
sisting of the mergers in the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set A
∗(Pt|At−1),p l u sa( p o -
tentially empty) set of mergers that are CS-neutral given A
∗(Pt|At−1). Thus, all myopically
CS-maximizing merger policies diﬀer from one another only in their treatment of CS-neutral
mergers.27
6.2.3 Extension of Proposition 3
Establishing the claim of Remark 2 parallels the argument leading to Proposition 3 in the
text. We ﬁrst establish a generalization of Lemma 4, Lemma 4’. Speciﬁcally, Lemma 4’ states:
If all feasible but not-yet-approved mergers are proposed in each period, any myopically CS-
maximizing merger policy, which induces the approval sequence A1 = A∗
1(F1|∅) and At =
A∗
t(Ft\At−1|At−1) for all t>1, maximizes discounted consumer surplus for every realization
of feasible mergers F =( F1,...,FT). To establish this result, we use the following lemma, which
is also used to prove Proposition 3’:













Proof. The second and third inclusion properties in the display follow from Lemma 8, while the
equality follows from the same induction argument as in the proof of Lemma 4. To see the ﬁrst
inclusion property, A
∗(Ft|∅) ⊆A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1), observe that since A
∗
(Ft|∅) is a solution to
the problem of myopically maximizing consumer surplus given that the set of proposed mergers
is Ft\At−1 and mergers At−1 have previously been approved, the solution set to that problem
must be a subset of the solution set of the less constrained problem of myopically maximizing
consumer surplus given that the set of proposed mergers is Ft and no mergers have previously
been approved.
Applying Lemma 9 iteratively, we see that if all feasible mergers are proposed in period t,
then regardless of ﬁrms’ previous behavior the market structure in period t will contain the
set A
∗(Ft|∅) and be contained within the set A
∗
(Ft|∅), which implies that it is a solution to
the problem of maximizing consumer surplus in period t given that no mergers have previously
been approved. This implies that Lemma 4’ holds.
Note also that if in period t all mergers in A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 are proposed when
Ft\At−1 is the set of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers, then regardless of previous be-
havior by the ﬁrms the market structure in period t will again contain the set A
∗(Ft|∅)
and be contained within the set A
∗
(Ft|∅).T o s e e t h i s , o b s e r v e t h a t i f Pt is such that
A





while the fact that A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) — a set that myopically maximizes consumer surplus
when all mergers in Ft\At−1 are proposed — is feasible when Pt is proposed, implies that
27Note also that CS-neutral mergers are measure zero events in a model with a continuum of possible eﬃciency
realizations.
38A∗(Pt|At−1)=A











T h u s ,i fi na l lp e r i o d sa l lm e r g e r si nA
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) are proposed when Ft\At−1 is the set
of feasible but not-yet-approved mergers, then the outcome will yield optimal period-by-period
levels of consumer surplus.
These facts imply that dynamic optimality holds for any myopically CS-maximizing policy:
Proposition 3’ If the antitrust authority follows a myopically CS-maximizing merger policy,
then for each sequence F, every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium results in the same
optimal sequence of period-by-period consumer surpluses.
Proof. (Sketch) The proof follows very closely that of part (ii) of Proposition 3. It proceeds
by establishing, using an induction argument, that whenever Ft\At−1 is the set of feasible
but not-yet-approved mergers in period t,a l lm e r g e r si ns e tA
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) will necessarily
be proposed, which establishes the claim (using the argument above). One important change
relative to the case of the most lenient myopically CS-maximizing merger policy is that, in
any period t, future market structures may be aﬀected by whether a given merger Mk ∈
A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 is proposed today. However, these future market structure eﬀects can
involve merger Mk only if the merged ﬁrm would be inactive and can involve mergers other
than Mk only in situations in which those mergers are CS-neutral given the other mergers
being approved. They therefore have no eﬀect on the joint proﬁts of the ﬁrms in merger Mk,
so we can again focus solely on current period proﬁte ﬀects.
Consider the proposal of a merger Mk ∈ A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 in period t under the
assumption that future payoﬀs for the ﬁrms involved in that merger are independent of period
t behavior. Since A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) is the smallest myopically CS-maximizing set for Ft\At−1
given At−1, every merger in A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 is CS-increasing given every other merger
in that set and results in an active ﬁrm. Part (i) of Lemma 6’ implies that there is an ordering
of the mergers in A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1 that is CS-increasing at each step, which we denote
by (M1,...,MS). Suppose that all mergers Ms for s<kare proposed when Ft\At−1 is the set of
feasible and not-yet-approved mergers in period t (which is true when k =1 .) Consider the case
where b Pt = {M1,...,Mk}. We claim that all of the mergers in {M1,...,Mk} will be approved. To
see this, note ﬁr s tt h a ta l lo ft h em e r g e dﬁrms in {M1,...,Mk} will be active if all are approved
[since the price will be no less than if all of the mergers {M1,...,MS} = A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1)\At−1
are approved]. Hence, by part (ii) of Lemma 6’, every merger in b Pt is CS-increasing given the
other mergers in that set (and given the previously approved mergers At−1). If the antitrust
authority were to approve only a (possibly empty) subset of b Pt, part (i) of Lemma 6’ implies
that the antitrust authority could strictly increase consumer surplus by approving the other
mergers in b Pt as well. This proves the claim that all of the mergers in {M1,...,Mk} will be
approved when b Pt = {M1,...,Mk}.
28The argument in footnote 13 implies that the consumer surplus levels with approved mergers
A∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) and A∗(Pt|At−1) must be the same. Since each of these two sets has the property that
every merger in the set is CS-increasing given the other mergers in the set, we can apply Lemma 7’ to show
that the two sets must be the same.
39Consider now the case where {M1,...,Mk} ⊂ b Pt. Using the same argument as above, the
set {M1,...,Mk} has the property that every merger in the set is CS-increasing given the other
mergers in that set, and so [by part (i) of Lemma 6’] for any strict subset Y ⊂ {M1,...,Mk},
there exists a merger M0 ∈ {M1,...,Mk}\Y that is CS-increasing given Y . We claim that
{M1,...,Mk} ⊆ A∗
t(b Pt|At−1) in any myopically CS-maximizing policy, so that all of the merg-
ers in {M1,...,Mk} will be approved. To see this, suppose otherwise that {M1,...,Mk} *
A∗
t(b Pt|At−1). Note ﬁrst that every merger in A∗
t(b Pt|At−1) is CS-nondecreasing given the
other mergers in that set. Since b Pt ⊆ Ft\At−1, the equilibrium price under market struc-
ture A∗
t(b Pt|At−1) must be weakly higher than under market structure A∗
t(Ft\At−1|At−1),a n d
the equilibrium price under market structure A∗
t(Ft\At−1|At−1) must be the same as un-
der market structure A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) (by virtue of both sets being CS-maximizing given
the same set of proposed mergers and given the same market structure). Since all of the
merged ﬁrms in {M1,...,Mk} a r ea c t i v ew h e nm a r k e ts t r u c t u r ei sA
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1),t h i s
implies that these ﬁrms will also be active when the market structure is A∗
t(b Pt|At−1).L e t
Y = A∗
t(b Pt|At−1) ∩ {M1,...,Mk}. Since all of the merged ﬁrms in {M1,...,Mk} are ac-
tive when market structure is A∗
t(b Pt|At−1), Lemma 7’ implies that there exists a merger
M0 ∈ {M1,...,Mk}\Y that is CS-increasing given all of the mergers in A∗
t(b Pt|At−1).B u tt h i s
means that the antitrust authority can strictly increase consumer surplus by approving merger
M0 in addition to all of the mergers in A∗
t(b Pt|At−1)\At−1, a contradiction to A∗
t(b Pt|At−1) be-
ing myopically CS-maximizing. This proves the claim that all of the mergers in {M1,...,Mk}
will be approved when {M1,...,Mk} ⊂ b Pt. Hence, using the same arguments as in the proof
of Proposition 3, proposal of merger Mk is strictly proﬁtable. Applying induction starting at
k =1 , it follows that all mergers in A
∗(Ft\At−1|At−1) will be proposed.
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